Since the start of the conflict in Iran, President Trump has repeatedly criticized our allies in Europe for not being there for the United States when their support could have been useful. He has criticized NATO in particular for failing to provide adequate assistance, while the United States has historically provided substantial support to its NATO allies when needed.
This criticism reflects a larger reality: the United States and Europe are fundamentally different. While maintaining alliances remains important, the war between Russia and Ukraine since 2022 has prompted efforts to strengthen these ties.
In reality, the United States functions as a fundamentally different society from Europe. Therefore, American interests will not always align—and have not consistently aligned—with those of European allies. A country can remain an ally without being fully aligned in its long-term objectives, but that distinction must be acknowledged and reflected in policy.
Rather than focusing on cultural differences, it is more meaningful to examine differences in underlying societal values. The two civilizations appear similar, but significant differences emerge upon closer analysis.
Americans, above all, value what is often referred to as “democracy.” The term is frequently used, but rarely understood, especially in the context of American government. The United States is not a democracy, but a constitutional republic. Even so, we Americans maintain a level of influence over our government unmatched by almost any other country in the world. This stems from the extensive protections embedded in the Constitution, which both limit government power and expand individual liberty.
Enumerated rights—such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right to assembly—provide Americans with tools to influence government beyond elections. These rights ensure that even when election results do not align with one’s views, individuals still have meaningful ways to influence the system.
Beyond structural protections, Americans also exhibit a unique level of distrust toward government—one that is not mirrored to the same extent in European societies. Constitutional provisions such as the 3rd Amendment, which prohibits the quartering of soldiers, and the 4th Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, reflect a clear intent to limit government overreach.
Additionally, amendments such as the 5th, 6th, and 7th outline protections for individuals facing prosecution. The right to a grand jury, for example, reflects a system in which citizens are judged by their peers rather than solely by institutional authority—a principle that is far less prominent in European legal systems.
This broader pattern reveals a fundamental difference: Americans are more inclined to distrust centralized authority and insist on direct safeguards against it. While individual rights are not absolute in the United States, they are often more expansively applied than in comparable European systems. For instance, speech protections in the United States extend far beyond those in many European countries, where laws regulating hate speech impose limits that would be immediately ruled as unconstitutional in America.
The concept of the social contract, often associated with thinkers such as Thomas Paine, argues that individuals surrender certain rights in exchange for governance. However, Americans have historically been less willing than Europeans to make that trade. The foundation of the United States was shaped by a deep skepticism that government would adequately protect individual rights—a concern that influenced the drafting of the Constitution itself.
This foundational distrust has shaped American governance. It has led to a system that prioritizes limiting authority rather than expanding it.
When examining international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and, arguably, NATO, this divide becomes even more apparent. European nations are generally more willing to support supranational organizations that centralize authority beyond national governments. From an American perspective, however, these institutions often represent a transfer of power away from democratic accountability.
As a result, the United States tends to be far more cautious about participating in or expanding such frameworks, even when they may offer certain strategic benefits.
This fundamental difference between Europe and the United States makes international governing structures less effective—and often less beneficial—for American interests. Multinational agreements and institutions may provide greater advantages to European nations than to the United States.
Alliances remain valuable, and differences between allies are inevitable. However, expanding or maintaining the current depth of transatlantic cooperation should not be treated as inherently beneficial in every circumstance. These relationships must be evaluated based on alignment of interests, not assumptions of shared values.
Many Democrats, who tend to favor a larger federal government and place greater trust in institutions, are more inclined to support deeper engagement with Europe. That position reflects a degree of ideological overlap with European governance models, particularly in terms of centralized authority and institutional trust.
This approach risks undermining the core value that shaped American society into the greatest nation-state in modern history: a healthy distrust of government.
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