Sitting in a skybox overlooking the gigantic green-screen stretched across the Pepsi Center stage, the scene looks more like a film set for the next Wachowski brothers CG blockbuster than a political convention. I can’t even begin to calculate the cost of presidential politics.
Everything in the Pepsi Center is robotic and electric. Massive LCD screens are lined up behind the delegate floor and three skyscraper-sized jumbotron screens display the action for those in the cheap seats.
This place makes Vegas look like a Kosovo.
Each trash receptacle aligned inside and outside of the Pepsi Center is guarded by earnest and apparently Red Bull–fueled “Green Police.” They monitor the trash and intimidate passersby to recycle each and every aspect of their refuse — unwanted nachos into one bin; plastic nacho container into another; plastic spork into another; and used napkin into yet another. And yet for a political party that has gone green with such exuberance, no one seems to worry about the carbon footprint of the convention’s theatrics: I’m betting the Back to the Future DeLorean’s flux capacitor used less electricity than the elevating podium I watched going up and down in mere seconds.
The lights go dark inside the Pepsi Arena and the Rocky Mountain Children’s Choir rehearses the national anthem and their acapella performance literally sends shivers down my spine. Children singing our anthem, each face more bright and innocent than the next. Now this embodies the hope for a new America that I have heard ad nauseum since arriving here on Sunday.
Interrupting this moment are loud announcements from the local radio and television media who are broadcasting high above the arena and are taking in the same scene. To his listening audience I hear one personality shout with pride, “There is a large American flag coming down from the ceiling. In the midst of all this technology the lone American flag is a great touch. So patriotic.”
I looked again at the lone Stars and Stripes dropping down from the proscenium arch from atop the stage. This was nothing more than a large rectangular green screen. Old Glory, digitized.
This facsimile flag is the perfect metaphor for the political theatrics I have seen to date in the Mile High City: green-screen patriotism.
During Michelle Obama’s keynote address, the only time I heard mention of combat veterans was to cast us as victims. What we need. What we are missing. Empty chairs at empty tables.
The complete disconnect to why we serve and why we volunteer to do what we do devastates me. I see the anger over the war in these delegates. I have tried desperately — and in vain, thus far — to connect with these angry protesters who, in the guise of passion for American greatness, violate the sanctity of those who have fallen in Iraq and Afghanistan.
If it were not for this political season, 80 days from a presidential election, would any of this be on display? This is a party whose leadership, for the first time in American history, is unified to stop a war in the midst of the fight. They have tried to defund, derail, and dissuade the American military from the strategy of the surge that has undeniably won the war in Iraq.
This past weekend on Meet The Press, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi again called the surge a failure. And Senator Obama says he would vote against the surge even today.
For the betterment of the country, the Democratic party leadership must stop taking their directives from MoveOn.org handlers and create a new organization that would better reflect the realities of what our nation, like it or not, faces across the angry seas.
GrowUp.org would far better reflect the platform of the party that elected President John Fitzgerald Kennedy — who stared down the barrels of Soviet expansionism and forced Russia to flinch, saving us all from nuclear war while establishing the true power of America.
Veterans with boots freshly dusted with Iraqi and Afghan sand cannot expect their nation to anticipate our every post-war need — but we do expect the ruling parties in Washington to understand and respect the reasons why we are prepared to fight. Politicians who refuse to acknowledge the success that our blood has purchased on the ground in Iraq will never win our allegiance with a few big-government spending initiatives.
“Thank you for the new GI Bill, Congress. But I am winning the war you sent me to fight and told me I couldn’t win. Can I get a little respect instead?”
We fight today for those singing below me on the Pepsi Arena floor. We fight to keep that innocent look on the faces of these children and of our own — to protect them from the horrors of this world and the desperate violence of our enemies. We fight to secure their dreams of the future from those who would steal them away.
No child should understand the realities of our harsh world at this tender age. But we should expect our political leadership to understand. Or must we merely “hope” that they do?
When the Democratic party’s mainstream proposed cutting the funding for the war in Iraq in August 2007, Sen. Joseph Biden responded eloquently: “There’s no political point worth anybody’s life out there. None.”
Amen, sir. There is also no political point or party platform worth the cheapening of those brave men and women who gave their utmost to protect our fundamental freedoms. None.
Before the end of this great convention I hope to hear further proof that we are still on the same page.
This remains the only anti-surge talking point on the Left. One problem, though: it’s no longer true — especially in light of the Iraqi government’s “surge” to autonomy, which is emblematic of their newfound political aptitude. The Maliki government has passed 15 of the 18 political benchmarks our Congress laid before it, not to mention taking on rogue Shia militias throughout the country and bringing the largest Sunni political party back into the fold. It’s not a beacon of democracy yet, but it is Iraq-ocracy.
In light of this indisputable political progress and the dramatic drop in violence in Iraq — which Brokaw referenced — Pelosi’s position is a radical one. Unfortunately, we’ve come to expect such political talking points from Ms. Pelosi — nothing short of a Planned Parenthood in every Iraqi village would denote success for her. But what of the man who has pledged to usher in a new kind of politics?
Senator Barack Obama has done his best to make it appear as if he has embraced the surge, noting in his VFW speech last week, that “gains have been made in lowering the level of violence” (note that passive construction) and that Iraq’s Security Forces have “increase[ed] capacity.” Such factual acknowledgements are welcome. Yet when actually pressed on the subject he continues to insist — as does Pelosi — that the surge has not worked. He is effectively embracing the surge without embracing it at all.
Obama has gone so far as to insist — when pressed by Katie Couric last month — that if given the opportunity to support or oppose the surge again, he would still oppose it. So, on one hand, Obama recognizes success in Iraq. But on the other hand, he still opposes the American policy that fostered that success. In Obama’s mind, this is not a contradiction.
The reason why is that Obama won’t admit that the gains we’ve seen in Iraq are at all related to the surge. He knows things have improved in Iraq — even on the political front — but credits everything but the surge strategy and U.S. troops for those improvements. Sure, he’ll say on the stump that “our troops have accomplished every mission” and “they have performed brilliantly.” But in the very next breath, he’ll deny that they were responsible for the success (remember: “gains have been made”). It seems as if nothing good can possibly have come from U.S. military policy in Iraq simply because it went ahead without Obama’s blessing.
In January of this year, Obama said that security gains were achieved because — get this — Sunni tribes in Anbar were scared that “Democrats elected [to Congress] in 2006” would hasten withdrawal. He has never retracted this unsubstantiated claim. More recently, Obama and his apologist, Madame Speaker, credit improvements in Iraq almost exclusively to the ceasefire of Muqtada al Sadr’s militia and the Sunni awakening (again, supposedly induced by the Democrats). Pelosi has even cited the “goodwill of the Iranians” as a factor; ignoring U.S. intelligence that shows Iranian arms and expertise are killing our troops.
I gladly acknowledge that other factors (well, aside from the ludicrous proposition on Iranian goodwill) have been integral to progress in Iraq. But intellectual integrity should compel Democratic leaders to admit that, at the very least, the surge has been a significant factor in the gains. Why not, if only for the sake of the troops (who, by the way, comprise “the surge”), admit that it worked?
Because detaching the surge — and the troops — from the progress in Iraq is a political necessity for Obama; admitting even the qualified success of the surge would require admitting his failure in judgment. Obama’s entire campaign was born in the notion that he exercised superior judgment on Iraq. Abandoning that proposition now would risk alienating his antiwar base.
And who gets the shaft in this equation? The soldiers and Marines who made the surge happen, that’s who. They get no credit from Obama and other leading Dems, whose mantra remains “we support the troops, but not the war.” They support the troops . . . but not so far as to upset Pelosi and Obama’s public narrative on Iraq. In order to discredit the surge strategy, its architects, and its principal political champion — John McCain — they are even willing to credit progress in Iraq to Muqtada al Sadr and Iran.
At the convention today, I suspect, we’ll see and hear only a few platitudes about success in Iraq — our “troops are wonderful, but the policy failed” they’ll say; but bend your ear and see if you hear anything positive about the surge. You won’t.
It needn’t be that way, and for the sake of our country’s future — in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader war on terror — Obama and Co. should re-examine what it means to be for our troops in the abstract but against their present mission. If not, the American people just might do it for them.
Critics have sought to minimize Iraq’s dramatic improvement in security, saying that it has failed to produce political accommodation among the country’s sects. These pundits would benefit from talking to Raheem: Security is not divorced from politics in counterinsurgency. The success of Coalition forces in protecting the people is laying the foundation for political progress.
When the government cannot provide security, people look elsewhere for help, often falling back on ethnic, sectarian, or tribal loyalties. From the chaos emerge militants, who offer protection to vulnerable communities and exploit them in return. Since these armed groups depend on violence for power, they have no incentive to reach a peaceful solution. This dynamic helps explain the success of the new counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. Securing the people breaks this cycle of violence, permitting political movement.
The strategy is working. U.S. and Iraqi forces have a round-the-clock presence in towns and cities, reducing support for militants. As a result, the public could reject the Sunni al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Shiite Mahdi Army, which brought the country to the brink of civil war in 2006.
Reconciliation among ordinary Iraqis is occurring. An ABC News poll in March found that 92 percent of Iraqis felt that forced separation was bad for Iraq. Even though Baathist Sunnis ruled over the majority Shia population under Saddam, 63 percent of Shias favored government jobs for former mid- to low-level Baathists. Moreover, 89 percent of all Iraqis supported Sunni participation in elections.
Visiting mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad that saw some of the worst violence, one is struck by a resurgent wave of Iraqi nationalism. People are again identifying themselves as Iraqis, not as members of sects. Shias welcomed a mainly Sunni Iraqi army brigade when it arrived in Basra to drive out the Mahdi army. With increasingly mixed Iraqi Security Forces, hundreds of thousands of Sunnis and Shias now put their lives in each others’ hands during operations.
It is important not to exaggerate the significance of this grassroots reconciliation. Saddam’s rule played on ethnic and sectarian identities for decades, and the recent strife reinforced his legacy. As the ABC News poll also revealed, Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds have different views on how their lives are going. At the same time, it is critical not to dismiss the improved relations among ordinary Iraqis.
Today, the main issue is whether political accommodation can occur at the national level. The Iraqi government is finally taking action. Earlier this year, the parliament passed legislation aimed at addressing Sunni grievances concerning de-Baathification reform, amnesty for detainees, and provincial powers. The parliament has still not passed a law to distribute oil proceeds, but at least de facto revenue sharing is taking place. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has taken on both Sunni and Shia extremists, improving the government’s legitimacy.
Nevertheless, failure to make critical reforms could plunge Iraq back into chaos. Provincial elections, which were supposed to restore more power to Sunnis, were delayed, possibly to early 2009. The Maliki government’s slow integration of former Sunni insurgents into the ISF is preventing them from having a stake in the new Iraqi state. There are also signs that ruling parties are blocking nonviolent elements of the Mahdi army from participating in politics.
Due to this complicated picture, it is too early to say if the increased security will produce lasting political accommodation and stability. But the answer to this question will likely become apparent in the next year, as the Iraqi government reveals whether it will improve ISF integration and conduct fair provincial elections. If these events do not happen, those shut out of power might resort to violence.
However, unless this occurs, the present focus on security should not be altered. It has laid the groundwork for political progress. No other strategy, including the 2006 approach of withdrawing U.S. troops regardless of conditions in Iraq, has advanced either grassroots or national accommodation.
What I’ve seen in Samarra, and what is happening throughout Iraq, is enough to make Americans of either party proud. After years of getting it wrong — or at best, only partly correct — in Iraq, today we are winning the war and setting the conditions for an enduring peace in that country, even in perpetual al Qaeda cesspools like Samarra. Faced with a determined enemy, hell-bent on bringing America to her knees in Mesopotamia, American military will, adaptability, and might are carrying the day.
Yet too many Americans, consumed with their daily lives or restricted by partisan blinders, see the progress and say: “Who cares? What does it matter? We should have never been there in the first place.” While I disagree with this position, I understand its origins. Americans feel betrayed by what many consider the suspect rationale for the war, have been frustrated by its early conduct, and remain wary of a war without end. These feelings don’t bother me, as they could change when victory — and therefore a drawdown — is achieved in Iraq.
What bothers me, however, is the self-aggrandizing notion that opposing the Iraq war then automatically devalues the important of the endeavor today. Today’s hardcore Iraq war detractors — politicians, pundits, and polemicists alike — all use the same lines of argument to smear the importance of the Iraq war at every turn. The surge was purely a tactical success to them, whereas Iraq overall has been a strategic blunder.
First, they claim, Iraq is not a central front in the global war on terror because al Qaeda wasn’t in Iraq in 2003; second, Iraq is a distraction from the real war in Afghanistan; third, the presence of troops in Iraq — and anywhere in the Middle East — perpetuates their hatred for us, thereby creating more jihadists. While there are plenty of overarching reasons to dispute these claims, my latest trip to Samarra suggests these assertions are not just counter-factual, but dangerously divisive.
I challenge anyone to walk the streets of Fallujah, Baqubah, Samarra, or elsewhere in Iraq and tell the locals that their city — their neighborhood — has not been an al Qaeda battlefront. Every Samarran I spoke with — every single one — brought up “al Qaeda,” pronouncing the name with a guttural disdain distinct in Iraqi accents. Most have a family member who has been killed by al Qaeda’s indiscriminate tactics, and still more have no desire to live in their seventh-century fantasy world.
“But this isn’t al Qaeda central we’re talking about,” detractors might say. “These are local thugs acting under their banner.” Wrong. Al Qaeda central has been funneling foreign fighters — primarily Syrians and Saudis — to Samarra, and throughout Iraq, for years. In fact, a few months ago, a raid south of Samarra uncovered the primary administrative hub for al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The bunker complex — piled with medical records, travel documents, and pay stubs — was where foreigners were sent before receiving their suicide assignments. Al Qaeda literature and videos littered the underground headquarters.
While the vast majority of the leadership and financing for AQI comes from outside Iraq, most of their foot soldiers in Samarra are indeed locals. Nonetheless, unlike Americans who wring our hands over ‘foreign versus local’ fighters, Samarrans I spoke with draw no such distinction — same ideology, same brand, same violent tactics. Al Qaeda made Iraq its central front in 2004, and Iraqis faced the consequences. Today, al Qaeda central wishes it had chosen more wisely.
As for the “distraction” argument, war detractors actually have it backwards — Iraq has actually proven to be a distraction for al Qaeda. Their choice to fight in Iraq was, in retrospect, a strategic blunder. (Although it wouldn’t have been, had we withdrawn as some proposed). Al Qaeda had little indigenous support there prior to 2003, and Iraq’s educated and largely secular population was not predisposed to radical Islam. As a result, al Qaeda’s defeat in places like Samarra has denied them terrain for decades to come; and has once again relegated them to the hills of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Qaeda will indeed think twice next time they attempt to expand their power base.
America must re-commit to winning the war in Afghanistan as well — plain and simple. We need to kill Osama bin Laden and every last one of his henchmen. However — unlike Iraq — Afghanistan is not advantageous terrain for American warfighters, as al Qaeda benefits from widespread tribal support, safe haven in Pakistan, and bountiful organic funding sources. While I’m confident that General Petraeus will recalibrate U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, it will be a tough fight — requiring additional troops, time, and resources.
Lastly, war detractors continue to propagate the myth that the terrorists and insurgents are “anti-American antibodies” trying to keep their body politic healthy. The American presence in Iraq, they argue, is the cause of the sickness there. If we just leave, everything will get better. My experiences on the ground in Samarra — and the facts of the new counterinsurgency strategy — directly refute this. As we have surged into neighborhoods — to protect the Iraqi people, earning their trust, and benefiting from their help — violence has dropped, and locals have turned against the jihadists.
American troops are tolerated, even welcomed when they effectively provide security; but their presence is cursed when it does not accompany progress. Violence persists not because American troops are present, but when we are present and feckless. For years, al Qaeda exploited our inability to protect the Iraqi people, spreading rumors that our incompetence was actually part of a larger conspiracy to keep them suffering. The security structures American forces have helped build — of, with, and for the people — has changed this. One trip to Samarra would demonstrate this to any objective observer.
The world will continue to watch Iraq. Whether Americans like it or not, what ultimately happens on the streets of Samarra — militarily, politically, and economically — will reverberate through the Middle East and the world. Will our allies see a strong America that wins its wars and stands by its friends? Or will our enemies — namely Iran — be emboldened by perceived American weakness?
Osama bin Laden and his followers jumped at the chance to “bleed out” the Americans in Iraq, believing we didn’t have the stomach for a prolonged fight on two fronts. Thanks to the political courage of a few — and the military courage of many — American have proven bin Laden wrong. Their victory in Iraq would have emboldened al Qaeda to expand their ambitions; instead, their military and ideological defeat has sent the “faithful” back to Afghanistan with their tail between their legs. May we finish them there.
The shops along this market, and industries throughout Samarra, are slowly coming back to life. In 2007, al-Qaeda strong-armed businesses into closing, even firing indiscriminately into markets to deter their existence. This brutal bravado is a thing of the past, but deeper civic problems remain, severely curtailing Samarra’s ability to fully rebuild. While the city’s soul has been reborn, piles of rubble, bombed out buildings, and unemployed young men still dominate Samarra’s streetscape.
As outlined in previous posts, security gains in Samarra have been dramatic: IED attacks are down 97 percent, small-arms attacks are down 80 percent, and confiscated enemy weapons caches are up by 800 percent since December 2007. We’ve at last created the necessary security environment for economic and political progress — the first and most important step in any counterinsurgency fight. The rest of the country experienced this transformation in 2007; it took another year for Samarra to catch on.
But crumbling sidewalks and roads, unreliable water and electricity, and under-developed government leadership prevent Samarrans from putting the devastation of the past five years fully behind them. When I served in Samarra, we did our best to address development and reconstruction, to little avail. Today, the American unit in Samarra — “No Slack” infantry battalion — has the chance to pick up our slack.
You might ask: Why is this our business? Why should Americans spend the time, money, and manpower to address governance and reconstruction in Iraq? The answer is not only, or even primarily, Samarra’s people. While I personally sympathize with their plight — “no one should live this way,” No Slack’s commander reiterated during my recent visit — rebuilding the city and putting its people to work is in America’s strategic interest. Clean water, abundant electricity, well-paved roads, open schools, teeming markets — these are America’s most potent weapons in limiting the propagation of al Qaeda’s worldview.
When I worked on governance in Samarra two years ago, our top responsibility was to develop the city council to create the indigenous mechanisms necessary to sustain local reconstruction and, eventually, manage redevelopment money. Aside from security concerns — which can’t be underestimated — three main factors prevented durable progress for Samarra in 2006: lack of broad political cooperation, absence of local budget money, and nonexistent provincial representation in Tikrit. All three are currently being addressed — with varying success, but they are being addressed.
When I arrived in Samarra last week, I was surprised to see the same mayor — Mahmood Khalaf Ahmed Al Bazzi — still at the helm. A coy and calculating man, he fled to Syria at the height of violence in 2007, only to return three months ago. (It was a wise decision: during his absence, al Qaeda-affiliated insurgents assassinated the interim mayor.) While Mayor Mahmood is not a natural leader, he is a competent administrator, and genuinely has Samarra’s best interests in mind. We shared a meal together upon my return, and he invited me to attend a city council meeting the next day.
I attended dozens of city council meetings in 2006, but nothing like what I saw that day. For two hours, in an overcrowded and under-ventilated meeting room — the power, and thus the air conditioning, switched off and on — I watched 18 city council members (only four local members attended meetings in 2006) from all the major tribes contentiously debate a smorgasbord of issues. I used the meeting agenda to fan my face, the first such agenda I’d ever seen in Iraq.
The day prior, I attended a small meeting of the Samarra Reconstruction Committee, a No Slack brainchild intended to foster joint American-Iraqi oversight of Iraqi reconstruction money. In an even smaller room beset by buzzing flies, the mayor, city-council president, Sons of Samarra leaders, local ministry directors, and two No Slack officers spent the afternoon interviewing prospective contractors for four renovation projects — Samarra’s water-treatment plant, asphalt plant, courthouse, and her largest market.
The contractors competed (on the merits) for the opportunity to manage these projects, all funded by the Iraqi government in a new program called ICERP — the Iraqi Commander’s Emergency Reconstruction Program. For the first time in five years, Samarra and other local governments have dedicated funding from the national government with which they can deliver tangible progress for their people. And for the first time in years, respectable contractors capable of quality workmanship feel secure enough to work in public. In Samarra, this means reconstruction — and local employment — may finally begin.
As for the ever-important metric of public opinion however, the local government has thus far failed. While the Sons of Samarra are widely popular, the local government is a laughingstock. Some things, I guess, are universal. “They are all talk, and no action,” said the Samarrans I spoke with. “They should leave the Green Zone to see the reality of how the people are living.” I’m not sure how aware city leaders are of this sentiment, but eventually it will either change, or they’ll be out of a job.
The discussion on the street and among local leaders always seems to turn to upcoming provincial elections. Samarra is leading the country in the number of new registrants for the not-yet-scheduled elections — a reflection of both Samarrans’ eager anticipation now, and their non-involvement in previous elections, which left Samarra with no votes in the provincial capital of Tikrit. Samarrans look forward to voting their own into power, and believe doing so will bring reconstruction money flowing down the Tigris.
What I am witnessing in Samarra is not Jeffersonian democracy, but it is Iraq-racy (as General Petraeus likes to call it). Votes are held, decisions are made — but only after tea is served. With security concerns in the rear-view mirror, Samarrans now expect their government — and American forces — to deliver on unmet promises. Their future, and our mutual security, hang in the balance.
Iraqis feel for the position of the United States. In an interview with an interpreter for the U.S. Marine unit, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, one Iraqi says that the US is in a “bad situation, no matter what route they take.” Nick, the name the interpreter uses because he doesn’t want the terrorist to know his real name, tells a different story about Iraq. “If the US stays, the Americans will hate their own government. If the US leaves, they (the terrorist) will kill us.” [# More #]
As he works for the US, he builds vacation time, just like most jobs in America. But he can’t take his vacations to go back to his home in Bagdad, because he will be killed. “If I drive to Bagdad, the bad guys, they will stop me at a check point to check my Id. When they see that I’m not one of them, boom. I’m dead”. He says that he loves being an interpreter for the Marines because he is helping his country and the Marines are fun people.
When asked about why he thinks the terrorist have been attacking the U.S. here, he replied, “When the U.S. came to Iraq to help the people, the bad guys see this as an opportunity to kill Americans. That’s all they want, to kill Americans”. “People hate America because they are free there. They think that if the U.S. spreads democracy to Iraq, you know, it could spread to other countries. So they try to stop it”. He said that most of the terrorist are from surrounding countries and that the countries in this area are afraid of the spread of democracy, that’s why they kill people that help the government.
“Iraqis don’t care as much about how is in charge as they do about their actions. They want a do-er, not a talker”. He worries that recent programs put out by the Iraqi government are just political fronts. “Right now, the government is fixing everything, they fix the electricity, the water, the sewers, the lights, the police, everything. We are just scared that all of this will go away when the U.S. leaves”.
He said that he knows the U.S. is spending a lot of money here and that it’s costing American lives, but that the Iraqi people are worth it. He feels that, if the U.S. were to leave Iraq, the terrorist would take over within two months. “They are just waiting for the U.S. to leave. They see the news, they know its coming. They are not dumb people”, he replied to a question about whether or not the terrorist would return if the U.S. leaves.
When Nick was first approached about doing this interview, he was happy to answer questions. As soon as the camera came out, he turned away. “Look, if they find me, if they see me working with the Marines, they will kill me, kill my family.” He wanted his story to be heard though, so he agreed to answer any and all questions.
I had the good fortune to be embedded with the Army's 716th Military Police Battalion, which is responsible for training, advising and assessing the Iraqi police in western Baghdad. I don't think it's an understatement to say that the MPs' mission is critical to sustaining the security gains of the surge in Baghdad. The increasingly proficient Iraqi Army is in the process of moving out of the capital. The Iraqi police will remain behind to keep the peace. This Iraqi transition within the larger U.S. to Iraqi transition of security responsibilities is a little discussed development that I hope to address soon in an article.[# More #]
For now, I will share a few short stories. It is hard to convey the turnaround that the new counterinsurgency strategy has produced in Baghdad, but I hope these anecdotes help.
First, I sat in a traffic jam today. Yes, this is a mundane activity in the United States. However, I was in an Army convoy in downtown Baghdad. Before the surge, we would have been the perfect target for a suicide car bomber. Now, American units share the road with Iraqis and limit the use of opposite traffic lanes, which help avoid traffic jams but can scare or anger civilians.
Second, I witnessed a U.S. commander tell his Iraqi police counterpart when his U.S. unit would return to meet him at his station. Previously, passing along such information was unthinkable due to insurgent infiltration of the Iraqi Security Forces. A U.S. patrol risked being ambushed if its travel plans were known. Now, such coordination for a meeting is simply courteous and more efficient.
Third, I saw Iraqi, not international, human rights workers visit the detention facility of a local Iraqi police station. The two men were government employees checking up on the conditions of the jail. And no, they did not know that I was visiting (they actually refused to talk to me due to ministry rules on interacting with the press).
Lastly, I met two Iraqi police generals - one Sunni and one Shiite - who worked in the same mixed area of Baghdad. The Sunni general led mostly Shiite officers, who were incredibly dedicated to him.
While security continues to be a focus of priority across Iraq, a substantial shift has occurred in the agenda of doing so. Whereas coalition forces were subject to swinging from modes of both attack, and defense, part in effort to better counter the strategic styles of terrorist warfare, we now operate with greater depth. 2nd Platoon showed me just that as the sun rose this morning. Armed with intelligence gathered from locals, and our own intuitions of notable area suspects, we patrolled through Bennezaid seeking out men of ‘military age.’ Not surprisingly, there were none to be found, so onward we went with raiding several homes. I am proud to say that not only was I too, able to lend a sharp eye in uncovering contraband (a hidden letter from Al Qaida to be specific), but how adept those I embed with are! These professionals know the drill. They know what should be where and why. They know both from past experiences, and also from the tips of surrounding Iraqis no longer willing to jeopardize themselves in account of their neighbors. These established relationships prove to be fundamental in winning the war. After uncovering fake ID’s, hidden pistols and AK-47’s, potential detonators for IED’S as well as wired battery packs ready to be packed with C4 explosive material, we packed up and headed home. This may not have been a big hit on a large cache, but it’s shakedowns like these that continue to quietly remove the weapons and their owners from the street. Just another typical day on the job…
Making it happen,
Kate
Samarra, Iraq — “You were an American soldier here in 2006?” asks Abu Saif.
“Yes,” I reply.
“Then you remember the Al Bazzi tribe,” he slyly posits. “We were one of the groups shooting at you,” he winks.
“Oh, yes, I remember,” I recall, now wearing my own grin. “And we shot back.”
He nods.[# More #]
With that, we part ways — but not before memorializing the moment with a photo.
The guys would not believe this. The Abu Saif I met today — leader in the Samarra Rescue Council — is not the Abu Saif we knew in 2006. Same goes for Abu Faruk, Abu Anis, and others in the room. All were High-Value Targets just two years ago — men we tried our damnedest to kill or capture — and today they are our partners.
For a soldier, it’s tough to square this circle — as I’d rather have avowed enemies six-feet under than six-feet in front of me; especially those who may have killed or injured a brother-in-arms. But today — embedded with a new unit in Samarra — I can more easily forget the memory of old enemies than the present threat of enduring ones. The friends of my brothers are — I suppose — my friends, and I’m witnessing the awakening I thought possible in 2006.
The story of the Samarra Rescue Council (Samarra’s “Sahwa,” or Awakening Movement) is complex, with every aspect of its development deserving detailed explanation. Yet I am certain of two things after witnessing the “Sons of Samarra” (SOS) firsthand: One, they would not be in existence today were it not for the persistence and foresight of brave Americans; and two, they are the single most important factor in Samarra’s dramatic, and quite sudden, turnaround. The brilliant counterinsurgency strategy I wrote about yesterday serves primarily to support this indigenous movement.
Ironically, the realization that an awakening movement was necessary came via our enemies’ actions. Am Muhamed, the provincial representative for the Samarra Rescue Council (SRC), says “after years of violence, we finally realized that al-Qaeda was only here to destroy our city.” That same realization is personal for the SRC chief, Sheik Khalid. He has lost 19 members of his family at the hands of al-Qaeda (and the affiliated Al Badri tribe), including his wife and eldest son. Al-Qaeda itself laid the groundwork for Sahwa.
Today, 2,200 SOS are paid to secure Samarra’s streets — with another 1,100 working as unpaid volunteers outside the city. Six months ago there were zero. The patrols I shadowed this week couldn’t go two blocks without seeing AK-47-toting SOS members in fluorescent vests alongside Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Two years ago — and, I presume, six months ago — we could patrol for hours without seeing any Iraqi Police.
This cooperation between the SOS and both ISF and American forces — primarily “No Slack” Infantry battalion — is what makes the Samarra Sahwa movement work. Despite a great deal of initial resistance (heck, they were shooting at each other six months ago) the SOS work alongside formal ISF — Samarra police, national police, and the Iraqi army. They hold weekly coordination meetings, and even man joint checkpoints.
In most parts of Iraq, cooperation between so-called “Sunni militias” and conventional ISF is unheard of. In fact, Samarra’s top security officer — Major General Rasheed Al Hilfi — told me yesterday “the relationship between the SOS and ISF in Samarra is the best in all of Iraq.” This may be a stretch, but nonetheless, the predominately Shia National Police have had little trouble working alongside the Sunni SOS inside the city.
On the American side, cooperation has existed from the beginning. Unable to get support from the Iraqi government, the Samarra Sahwa movement’s six founders (two imams, two former Baath-party intelligence officers, one businessman, and one Saddam-era army colonel) — four of whom I met — eventually approached No Slack at their patrol base in the city. It was a risky proposition, but as they told me repeatedly, “from the beginning, the Americans were very serious about it.”
Initial meetings started in October of 2007, and quickly accelerated when they were synched with a parallel effort by U.S. Special Forces to facilitate the return of key leaders from Syria. Without No Slack’s initiative and Special Forces’ backroom handiwork, the movement would never have taken off. The Sahwa leaders were scared to face al-Qaeda, divided amongst themselves, and inherently skeptical of their former adversaries.
Negotiations continued in secret until mid-February, after which the SOS received four days of training at an American base and then were promptly dispatched to man checkpoints throughout the city. The first few weeks were tense, but al-Qaeda hadn’t seen it coming, and they were knocked off their feet. In the first 16 days of its existence, the SOS uncovered 19 massive weapons caches. The real power brokers had taken back their streets, and the Americans had their back. Almost immediately, attacks throughout Samarra died off, and today show no sign of resuscitation.
The movement’s founders admit that many — if not most — of their members are former insurgents. Yet they stress that most were never hardcore fighters, and their current participation in the SOS centers largely on the $250 they receive each month. Not a bad chunk of change in a city boasting a staggering unemployment rate. That said, the SRC seems to keep close tabs on their men, as I witness the council agree to expel 21 SOS members suspected of having continued al-Qaeda ties.
The events of March 28, 2008, provide the most glaring example I found that SRC leaders are not the shady back-stabbers our media has made them out to be. On this day, Am Muhamed and another former insurgent spent the afternoon briefing the entire No Slack officer corps. The topic: “Tactics of Samarra insurgents and how to defeat them.” The class included personal insights on how insurgents attack, how they escape, where they hide their weapons, amongst other tips. If only the guys could see this.
This is all great stuff, but will go for naught if Samarrans don’t abide. So how do the people feel? Everyone I spoke with reveres the SOS as “the heroes of Samarra.” One local shopkeeper summed it up thus, “With all due respect to the Coalition Forces, it was the Sahwa movement that brought the most security to the city. Today is the safest Samarra has been since al-Qaeda arrived in 2004.”
When I sat down two days ago to interview SRC leader Am Muhamed, he concluded the interview with a statement: “Please pass along a message to your government from me. Tell them to do everything they can to get my boys hired into the Iraqi Security Forces. If they don’t get hired, they will go back to being jobless . . . and we go back to the starting point.”
This is the future challenge of the SOS. Nearly all 2,200 want to join the ISF; and while General Rasheed al-Hilfi and other ISF leaders vow to do what they can to integrate them, the process will be slow, and will end in disappointment for many. On top of this, the Maliki government is suspicious of the program and the American military is hell-bent on reducing the “bridging mechanism” that is the SOS. The later point, however, we can control.
A general policy of reducing the “Sons of Iraq” rolls is correct, as they were never meant to be a permanent force. But some thought must be given to the security implications of radically reducing their numbers. To me, this arbitrary administrative “goal” smells eerily similar to the choreographed battle-space “handovers” many units hastily executed with Iraqi security units from 2004-2006, only to see the territory fall back into enemy hands.
Today, we have al-Qaeda five feet under, and yet could still snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. The SOS — and equivalent groups across Iraq — have transformed the entire war; and without them, Samarra, and all of Iraq, would not be where they are today — closer to self-sufficiency than they’ve ever been. Success, not speed, must remain our lodestar. And transferring Iraq’s Sons into the legitimate Iraqi Security Forces must be dictated by temperance, not administrative timelines.
