The Department of Defense Inspector General is out with a new report detailing how the Pentagon sent millions of dollars in American taxpayer funding to a number of research labs in China and then lost track of how it was being used.
The audit was conducted in compliance with the National Defense Authorization Act and looked at where funds were sent, in addition to whether they were used in ways that could spark a pandemic. Investigators probed whether money was sent to the Chinese Communist Party, the Wuhan Institute of Virology and much more.
(U) Management Advisory: Review of DoD Funds Provided to the People’s Republic of China and Associated Affiliates for Research Activities or Any Foreign Countries for the Enhancement of Pathogens of Pandemic Potential (Report No. DODIG‑2024‑099)
The purpose of this management advisory is to inform Congress and DoD leadership of the results of our review required in response to Public Law 118‑31, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024,” section 252, “Audit to Identify Diversion of Department of Defense Funding to China’s Research Labs. Section 252 requires our office to identify and report to Congressional Defense Committees:
The amount of Federal funds awarded by the Department of Defense(whether directly or indirectly) through grants, contracts, subgrants, subcontracts, or any other type of agreement or collaboration, during the10‑year period immediately preceding such date of enactment, that—(U) (1) was provided, whether purposely or inadvertently, to
(U) (A) the People’s Republic of China;
(U) (B) the Communist Party of China;
(U) (C) the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any other organization administered by the Chinese Academy of Sciences;
(U) (D) EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. for work performed in China on research supported by the Government of China, including any subsidiaries and related organizations that are directly controlled byEcoHealth Alliance, Inc.;
(U) (E) the Academy of Military Medical Sciences or any of its research institutes, including the Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology;
(U) (F) any other lab, agency, organization, individual, or instrumentality that is owned, controlled (directly or indirectly), or overseen (officially or unofficially) by any of the entities listed in subparagraphs (A) through (E); or
(U) (2) was used to fund research or experiments that could have reasonably resulted in the enhancement of any coronavirus, influenza, Nipah, Ebola, or other pathogen of pandemic potential or chimeric versions of such a virus or pathogen in the People’s Republic of China or any other foreign country.
The report states that due to a lack of proper oversight and tracking, much of the funding was lost and where it went or how it was used is unaccounted for.
"The full extent of DoD funds provided to Chinese research laboratories or other foreign countries for research related to enhancement of pathogens of pandemic potential is unknown," the report found. "The DoD did not track funding at the level of detail necessary to enable us to completely and accurately determine if the DoD provided funding to Chinese research laboratories or other foreign countries for research related to the enhancement of pathogens of pandemic potential. For example, when the DoD awards funds to an entity, the entity often provides some of those funds to other organizations for subawards or contracted services. DoD officials stated that during the initial grant application process, they have visibility over who the subaward recipients are intended to be. However, we found that DoD organizations lacked visibility of subaward information over the life of contracts and grants."
Due to limitations in the DoD's tracking systems, the full extent of DoD funds provided to Chinese research laboratories for research related to enhancement of pathogens of pandemic potential is unknown. Read our new report now: https://t.co/Ts7V7C15V9
— DoD Office of Inspector General (@DoD_IG) June 20, 2024
"We found significant limitations with the adequacy of data, similar to the observations the GAO found in its reports. Specifically, the DoD did not track funding at the level of detail necessary to determine whether the DoD provided funding to Chinese research laboratories or other foreign countries for research related to enhancement of pathogens of pandemic potential," the report concludes. "In addition, DoD organizations did not have visibility of subaward information throughout the life of contracts and grants. In addition, except for the CDMRP electronic grants system, DoD organizations could not effectively search award systems to identify all contracts, subcontracts, grants, and subgrants that may have been related to pathogen research performed by China and other foreign countries. As a result, DoD organizations could not produce a complete population of pathogen research grants and subawards necessary for us to conclude on the use of DoD funds provided for pathogen research."
Oddly, the page about Chinese entities is redacted.
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