Amy wrote about the opinion earlier this morning: the Supreme Court ruled that Title IX allows schools to provide separate sports teams for men and women defined by their gender assigned at birth, and that this does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. It was a 6-3 ruling:
On January 13, the Supreme Court heard two cases — Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J. — that both deal with the same issue, namely state laws that prohibit males from participating in women's and girls' sports even if they identify as transgender.
Little v. Hecox is the case out of Idaho, stemming from a 2020 law called the Fairness in Women's Sports Act (HB 500). That act bars 'trans women' and 'trans girls' from female athletic teams in public K-12 schools and colleges. Lindsay Hlcox, a male, sued after being barred from joining Boise State University's women's cross-country and track teams. Helcox claimed the legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX.
West Virginia v. B.P.J. is a similar case. Following West Virginia's enactment of the Save Women's Sports Act (HB 3293), which requires public school and college teams to be designated based on biological sex. It bars males from girls' and women's teams in secondary schools and colleges. The mother of Becky Pepper-Jackson, a male, sued on his behalf on similar grounds.
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, and well, this line is going to make liberals angry [emphasis mine]:
The Court correctly holds that neither Title IX nor the Equal Protection Clause prohibits States from offering sex separated athletics. A man does not have a legal right to compete against women just because he believes that he is a woman. I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to make two points. First, transgender status is not a suspect class requiring heightened equal-protection scrutiny. United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U. S. 495, 547–557 (2025) (BARRETT, J., concurring). The class of people who claim transgender status could more accurately be described as people who are experiencing “gender dysphoria,” which is not a “discrete group.” Id., at 550–551 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 566–567 (ALITO, J., concurring and concurring in judgment). Because “gender dysphoria” is a mutable mental state that is the object of psychiatric treatment, it does not resemble the immutable characteristics on the basis of which our precedents have applied heightened scrutiny— race, sex, or national origin. Instead, gender dysphoria resembles other characteristics on the basis of which legislatures may classify with a merely rational basis. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 321 (1993) (mental illness); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 220 (1982) (immigration status).
Legislatures have many obvious rational bases to keep men who believe that they are women out of teams and private spaces reserved for women. Second, as the Court recognizes, this case concerns “biological men” and “boys who identify as girls.” Ante, at 10, 27. Men and boys with gender dysphoria are not women or girls, even if they believe that they are. Sex is an immutable “biological” characteristic, see ante, at 10; it is binary; and “man” and “woman,” “boy” and “girl,” are the terms that correspond to adults and children of each sex. See A. Byrne, Are Women Adult Human Females? 177 Philosophical Studies 3783, 3786–3787 (2020). To use language to obscure reality—to show “indifference regarding the truth”— is to lie to the public and cease to treat our fellow citizens “as equal[s].” J. Pieper, Abuse of Language—Abuse of Power 17, 21 (1992).
Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion:
— Greg Price (@greg_price11) June 30, 2026
"Men and boys with gender dysphoria are not women or girls, even if they believe they are." 🔥 pic.twitter.com/wrD30jZOtP
Where’s the lie?
