They’re fighting a war, so while this is a crucial question, it’s more on the periphery. Yet, with Israeli troops now in the Gaza Strip, having invaded on October 28 and splitting the region in two, some outlets have circled back to something that was brought up days after Hamas’ brutal October 7 attacks that butchered at least 1,200 Israelis: how did Jerusalem miss this?
With the hostage-based ceasefire in effect for a few days—it’s now ended—there was some time to come back to this as there was a pause in the fighting. New documents were made available to some publications, like The New York Times, which has yet to be forgiven for its fake news take about the Gaza hospital bombing. However, their recent story about how Israel missed the attack is one that you probably already knew: the Jewish state didn’t believe Hamas could pull it off. It’s been regarded as Israel’s worst intelligence failure since the Yom Kippur War, an apt comparison, though it’s looking more like how we missed the 9/11 attacks. In proportion to population, Israel's October 7 attacks would be the equivalent of losing almost 40,000 Americans on the day the Twin Towers fell.
The document that outlined the growing Hamas threat codenamed “Jericho Wall,” details how Israeli intelligence analysts knew the terror group was planning something big for over a year. They didn't know the attack would occur on October 7, but something massive was in the works.
There is documentation that Israeli intelligence analysts knew Hamas had increased its training and capabilities but were rebuffed by the upper crust, citing the terror group’s lack of execution. It’s unknown if Benjamin Netanyahu ever saw this 40-page document, but it details everything, including Israel knowing that Hamas commandos were training on how to assault army bases and kibbutzim. They estimated that at least 60 portions of the Gaza fence would be stormed by terrorists, preceded by a massive rocket barrage. In all, it’s a damning report (via NYT):
Israeli officials obtained Hamas’s battle plan for the Oct. 7 terrorist attack more than a year before it happened, documents, emails and interviews show. But Israeli military and intelligence officials dismissed the plan as aspirational, considering it too difficult for Hamas to carry out.
The approximately 40-page document, which the Israeli authorities code-named “Jericho Wall,” outlined, point by point, exactly the kind of devastating invasion that led to the deaths of about 1,200 people.
The translated document, which was reviewed by The New York Times, did not set a date for the attack, but described a methodical assault designed to overwhelm the fortifications around the Gaza Strip, take over Israeli cities and storm key military bases, including a division headquarters.
Hamas followed the blueprint with shocking precision. The document called for a barrage of rockets at the outset of the attack, drones to knock out the security cameras and automated machine guns along the border, and gunmen to pour into Israel en masse in paragliders, on motorcycles and on foot — all of which happened on Oct. 7.
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… in July, just three months before the attacks, a veteran analyst with Unit 8200, Israel’s signals intelligence agency, warned that Hamas had conducted an intense, daylong training exercise that appeared similar to what was outlined in the blueprint.
But a colonel in the Gaza division brushed off her concerns, according to encrypted emails viewed by The Times.
“I utterly refute that the scenario is imaginary,” the analyst wrote in the email exchanges. The Hamas training exercise, she said, fully matched “the content of Jericho Wall.”
“It is a plan designed to start a war,” she added. “It’s not just a raid on a village.”
Officials privately concede that, had the military taken these warnings seriously and redirected significant reinforcements to the south, where Hamas attacked, Israel could have blunted the attacks or possibly even prevented them.
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Israeli security officials have already acknowledged that they failed to protect the country, and the government is expected to assemble a commission to study the events leading up to the attacks…Underpinning all these failures was a single, fatally inaccurate belief that Hamas lacked the capability to attack and would not dare to do so. That belief was so ingrained in the Israeli government, officials said, that they disregarded growing evidence to the contrary.
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Israel had also misread Hamas’s actions. The group had negotiated for permits to allow Palestinians to work in Israel, which Israeli officials took as a sign that Hamas was not looking for a war.
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The memo, which was viewed by The Times, said that Hamas had purchased sophisticated weapons, GPS jammers and drones. It also said that Hamas had increased its fighting force to 27,000 people — having added 6,000 to its ranks in a two-year period. Hamas had hoped to reach 40,000 by 2020, the memo determined.
It was a failure of imagination and part naiveté: you should never trust terrorists—ever. Whether this ends the Netanyahu government is an entirely different matter that won’t be decided anytime soon. He’s fighting a war that could expand to Lebanon, as there is a consensus to initiate military operations there against Hezbollah once Hamas has been either eliminated or degraded to the point where they are no longer a viable sociopolitical or military entity. There is a unity government aimed at achieving this, so when the dust clears, maybe BiBi will be booted from office. For now, he’s commanding Israeli forces to eliminate Hamas.
Yet, this detailed document answers the question of how Israel was caught off-guard on October 7.