In 1998, Congress responded to reports that American satellite companies may have helped China improve its rocket technology. The reaction was swift and well-intentioned. That year, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) reclassified commercial communications satellites as munitions under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), subject to the same export rules as missiles and fighter jets.

As a congressman who voted for the measure, I can attest that members acted with the best of intentions based on the information in front of them. Keeping sensitive technology from China’s military was the right objective. But the restrictions also encouraged foreign manufacturers to develop a new supply chain independent of the United States and to market “ITAR-free” satellites without American components. A policy intended to protect our technological advantage ultimately gave competitors a reason to build around it and undermined America’s domestic satellite industry in the process.

Today, Congress risks repeating that mistake with a new sensitive technology as it negotiates this year’s NDAA. Three proposals under consideration as part of the legislation — the AI OVERWATCH Act, MATCH Act and Chip Security Act — would add unnecessary restrictions across America’s semiconductor industry. That’s why Congress should pass a clean version of the bill that is focused on strengthening America’s military, instead of using it to add sweeping new export control mandates that could weaken the American companies we need to win the AI race against China.

Concerns about military applications and illegal diversion of chips are worth addressing, but these proposals go far beyond what is necessary. They would introduce additional licensing requirements, expand restrictions on chipmaking equipment, and require chip-security mechanisms that the Semiconductor Industry Association warns are “new, untested, and potentially infeasible.” They would also pressure allied equipment suppliers to adopt U.S.-aligned restrictions or face expanded American controls.

The cumulative effect would be greater cost and uncertainty for companies selling American technology. Customers deciding which AI stack to build upon may decide to bypass the United States altogether.

That matters because winning the AI race will require convincing countries and companies around the world to build on American technology. Their choice of chips helps determine which country’s software, services, and infrastructure they adopt. Once customers invest in a competing system, winning them back becomes considerably harder.

China is already flooding the market with its chips as it works to provide an alternative to the American AI stack. Huawei shipped 572,000 AI accelerators in China during the first half of this year, up from more than 300,000 a year earlier, at the same time that American chipmakers started losing significant amounts of market share. Such gains should force Congress to consider what new restrictions on American AI chip exports would accomplish.

Overly restrictive Biden-era controls helped create the openings Chinese suppliers are now exploiting. Instead of hampering the country’s AI industry, those controls gave Chinese competitors an incentive to develop alternatives and compete for market share. Continuing down this path risks reinforcing that trend by limiting the overseas sales that help American companies finance research, sustain specialized suppliers, and develop the next generation of technology.

Fortunately, President Trump has taken important steps toward correcting that approach. His administration stopped enforcing and moved to rescind Biden’s AI Diffusion Rule, which would have extended chip-export restrictions to countries around the world. Through the American AI Exports Program, he is also promoting complete packages of U.S. chips, models, software, and infrastructure to allies and partners. A Republican Congress should support that effort by passing a clean NDAA, without counterproductive export-control provisions that could undermine American technology exports.

It took Congress nearly 15 years to reform the satellite export controls instituted in the NDAA. By then, the Defense and State Departments had concluded that the restrictions were harming America’s industrial base and national security. Yet because those requirements were written into law, the administration could not simply adjust them. Reform required another act of Congress, while foreign competitors continued building businesses around avoiding American technology.

Congress should therefore learn from these past lessons and refrain from incorporating unnecessary AI chip export controls into this year’s NDAA. Protecting sensitive technology and preventing diversion remain essential, but those objectives must be pursued in ways that preserve America’s ability to compete and lead.

Rather than imposing broad new restrictions, policymakers should be guided by evidence about how restricted technology reaches unauthorized users. That means concentrating enforcement on prohibited buyers and the intermediaries that facilitate illegal diversion. Working with industry and allied governments to identify suspicious transactions and investigate smuggling networks will also be important. This would help keep sensitive chips out of unauthorized hands while allowing American companies to serve legitimate customers under clear, enforceable safeguards.

America’s security depends on both protecting its technological advantages and sustaining the companies that produce them. A successful export policy must serve both purposes, which is why Congress must pass a clean NDAA.

Todd Tiahrt is a former Member of the House of Representatives who served on the Committees on National Security and Intelligence as well as the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.