As Iran’s economy buckles under runaway inflation, a collapsing currency, and mounting strikes by workers, pensioners, and teachers, the ruling establishment in Tehran has entered a dangerous new phase – open internal conflict. The slogans of “unity” and “resistance” endlessly repeated by regime officials now ring hollow. Beneath the surface, rival factions are battling over how to preserve a system that increasingly appears incapable of saving itself.
The divisions have become impossible to conceal. Even regime-controlled newspapers now openly acknowledge fierce struggles inside the Majlis (parliament) and across the security and diplomatic apparatus. The latest confrontation erupted during the May 25 elections for the third session of Iran’s 12th parliament, where extremist factions mounted a determined effort to weaken Speaker Mohammad-Baqer Ghalibaf. Although Ghalibaf secured another term, the infighting revealed something far more significant than routine political rivalry. It exposed a regime split into two increasingly irreconcilable camps. One faction believes tactical concessions to Washington and the West offer the only path to preventing another nationwide uprising similar to protests earlier this year that resulted in a brutal crackdown by the regime, resulting in over 30,000 deaths. The opposing camp views compromise as existential surrender, a course that would demoralize the regime’s loyalist base, weaken its regional proxy network, and accelerate internal collapse.
That strategic divide now shapes every major decision in Tehran. The diplomatic front illustrates the fracture with particular clarity. Ghalibaf’s visit to Doha alongside Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati underscored the urgency surrounding negotiations with Washington. Talks reportedly focused on reopening the Strait of Hormuz, releasing frozen Iranian assets, and establishing a framework for de-escalation after months of regional confrontation.
The emerging memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran reportedly envisions a temporary ceasefire, phased sanctions relief, renewed Iranian oil exports, and the reopening of Hormuz in exchange for continued nuclear negotiations and maritime security guarantees. The framework reflects pressures on both sides. Iran’s rulers require economic relief to avert deeper financial collapse, while the United States seeks stability in one of the world’s most vital energy corridors without becoming trapped in another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict. Yet even limited engagement with Washington has triggered fury among Tehran’s ideological hardliners.
President Masoud Pezeshkian has attempted to calm tensions by publicly emphasizing loyalty to the supreme leadership while defending negotiations. In a revealing statement, he declared that no major decision occurs without the approval of Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the former supreme leader eliminated on the first day of the U.S.-Israel-Iran war. Although state media circulate messages from Mojtaba, he remains entirely absent from public life – no major speeches, no public appearances, only carefully managed statements distributed through official channels. There is still speculation that he has died of injuries sustained during the bombing raid that eliminated his father and other family members.
That growing aura of secrecy fuels speculation over succession struggles inside the regime. Recent statements attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei, calling for a “post-American regional order” and praising the so-called “axis of resistance,” appear aimed at reassuring hardliners and proxy militias that Tehran has not abandoned its long-term regional ambitions despite entering negotiations with Washington. Yet those same messages also expose the regime’s central dilemma. Tehran seeks sanctions relief and economic breathing space while simultaneously projecting revolutionary defiance. Sustaining both positions is becoming increasingly difficult.
The hardline response has been swift. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the extremist newspaper Kayhan, launched a blistering attack on the negotiating team. He accused diplomats of surrendering Iran’s leverage and warned against any arrangement that could weaken Tehran’s position over the Strait of Hormuz. Other hardline MPs echoed the same position. Amir-Hossein Sabeti insisted that any agreement with Washington would ultimately damage Iran, arguing that confrontation with the United States would continue regardless of diplomatic signatures. Hamid Rasaee similarly argued that four decades of hostility demonstrated America could never be trusted to honor commitments.
Such statements reveal a leadership gripped by fear. Hardliners understand that compromise with the West risks undermining the ideological foundations upon which the Islamic Republic has survived since the 1979 revolution. Anti-Americanism and permanent confrontation remain central instruments of internal control. At the same time, economic deterioration threatens renewed social unrest. Fresh American air strikes against Iranian-linked targets have further complicated the negotiations. Although U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio continues to insist diplomacy remains possible, the military escalation strengthens those inside Tehran who argue that Washington seeks regime change regardless of Iranian concessions.
The Israeli dimension adds another layer of volatility. Opposition leader Yair Lapid sharply criticized the emerging interim arrangement, warning that it grants Tehran economic breathing space while sacrificing Israeli strategic objectives. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to emphasize Israel’s freedom of military action, yet growing debate inside Israel reflects wider uncertainty over Washington’s long-term approach toward Tehran.
The greatest pressure, however, comes from below. Iranian society remains deeply restless. Workers, teachers, pensioners, and young people continue protesting despite severe repression. The regime’s leadership understands that another nationwide uprising could erupt with extraordinary speed if economic conditions deteriorate further. That fear explains the simultaneous pursuit of compromise abroad and repression at home. Yet neither faction inside the regime appears capable of offering a viable long-term solution. The pragmatists seek tactical concessions that may buy time but risk weakening ideological cohesion. The hardliners demand continued confrontation that threatens deeper economic collapse and renewed social unrest. Both paths point toward greater instability.
The invisibility of Mojtaba Khamenei and consequent uncertainty surrounding Iran’s leadership, mounting public anger, regional tensions, and widening divisions between Tehran, Washington, and Jerusalem have combined to create an exceptionally fragile moment. The central question facing Iran is no longer whether the regime confronts existential danger. That reality is already visible. The real question is which strategy will accelerate the crisis first, compromise that gradually erodes the system from within, or confrontation that drives the Iranian people back onto the streets demanding the overthrow of the entire regime?
Struan Stevenson was a member of the European Parliament representing Scotland (1999-2014), president of the Parliament's Delegation for Relations with Iraq (2009-14), and chairman of the Friends of a Free Iran Intergroup (2004-14). He is an author and international lecturer on the Middle East.