Nouri al-Maliki’s potential return to the premiership would be a profound strategic error that risks plunging Iraq back into the very crisis from which it has only partially emerged. His previous tenure from 2006 to 2014 was marked by sectarianism, repression, and systemic corruption. To reinstall the 75-year-old now, at a moment of acute regional tension and domestic fragility, would be to ignore the hard lessons of Iraq’s recent history. Under the Constitution of Iraq, Iraqis do not directly elect the prime minister. Instead, they vote in parliamentary elections for members of the Council of Representatives. After the election, the largest parliamentary bloc nominates a candidate for prime minister. The president of Iraq then formally tasks this nominee with forming a government. The nominee must assemble a cabinet and win a majority vote of confidence in parliament to become prime minister.
Following the 2025 parliamentary elections, no single bloc secured a decisive majority, producing a fragmented legislature and prolonged negotiations over government formation. The leading coalitions have struggled to agree on a consensus candidate, with divisions cutting across sectarian and factional lines. In this vacuum, figures with established political machinery and loyal parliamentary networks, including Nouri al-Maliki, have re-emerged as potential compromise candidates. His State of Law coalition’s ability to mobilize seats and broker alliances has positioned him once again within the list of viable nominees, despite the deep controversy surrounding his previous tenure.
During his eight years in power, Maliki presided over the steady erosion of Iraq’s democratic institutions. What began as a fragile post-Saddam experiment in pluralism quickly devolved into a centralized, personality-driven system. Maliki consolidated authority by subordinating the judiciary, politicizing the security forces, and marginalizing parliament. Rather than strengthening the rule of law, he bent it to serve political ends, targeting rivals, particularly from Sunni communities, with dubious terrorism charges, and forcing many into exile. He presided over the methodical construction of a sectarian state.
The consequences were catastrophic. By alienating large segments of the Sunni population, Maliki sowed the seeds of rebellion. Peaceful protests in cities like Fallujah and Ramadi were met with force, rather than dialogue. This heavy-handed response transformed legitimate grievances into armed resistance, creating fertile ground for extremist groups to flourish. The rise of ISIS in 2014 was enabled by the deep resentment and distrust cultivated under Maliki’s rule. His policies fractured Iraqi society and hollowed out the very institutions needed to defend it.
Equally damaging was the corruption that flourished under his leadership. Iraq, endowed with vast oil wealth, should have been on a trajectory toward prosperity and reconstruction. Instead, billions of dollars vanished into opaque networks of patronage and illicit enrichment. Public services remained abysmal, electricity shortages persisted, clean water was scarce, and infrastructure crumbled. For ordinary Iraqis, the promise of post-war recovery turned into a daily struggle for basic necessities. Corruption was systemic, embedded in the political order Maliki oversaw.
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Perhaps most troubling was his deep alignment with external actors, particularly Iran. While Iraq must maintain balanced relations with its neighbors, Maliki’s approach tilted decisively toward Tehran, compromising Iraqi sovereignty. Iranian-backed militias expanded their influence during his tenure, often operating beyond the control of the state. These groups not only undermined national unity but also contributed to cycles of violence and retaliation. Iraq became less an independent actor and more a battleground for regional power projection.
This history matters enormously today. Iraq stands at a crossroads, caught between competing geopolitical forces and internal divisions. The choice of prime minister will signal whether the country intends to move toward inclusive governance and balanced foreign relations or revert to sectarianism and external dependency. Maliki represents the latter path. His return would alarm not only domestic constituencies but also international partners whose support remains vital for Iraq’s economic and security stability.
Moreover, Iraq’s political system, though imperfect, has evolved since Maliki’s departure. There is greater awareness among political actors and civil society of the dangers of sectarian governance. Younger Iraqis, in particular, have demonstrated a clear desire for accountability, transparency, and national identity over factional loyalty. Reinstating a figure so closely associated with past failures would risk extinguishing these fragile but vital aspirations.
The regional context further heightens the stakes. With tensions involving major powers and neighboring states already elevated, Iraq cannot afford leadership that exacerbates internal divisions or aligns too closely with any single external actor, particularly Iran. It requires a prime minister capable of balancing relationships, maintaining sovereignty, and prioritizing national cohesion. Maliki’s record suggests he would struggle, if not outright fail, to meet these demands.
There is also the question of accountability. Serious allegations have long surrounded his time in office, including human rights abuses and the misuse of state resources. While political realities have thus far shielded him from meaningful scrutiny, these issues have not disappeared. Elevating him once again to the highest executive office would send a damaging message that past conduct carries no consequences, and that power can be regained regardless of performance or principle.
Iraq’s future depends on breaking cycles of misrule, not repeating them. The country has endured war, occupation, terrorism, and profound social upheaval. Its people deserve leadership that unites rather than divides, that builds institutions rather than undermines them, and that serves the public interest rather than narrow political agendas. Maliki’s previous tenure offers little evidence that he can fulfill such a role.
In the end, the decision over Iraq’s next prime minister is a test of the country’s commitment to a more stable and inclusive future. Choosing Maliki would be a step backward, one that risks reopening old wounds and reigniting the forces that once brought Iraq to the brink. The stakes could hardly be higher, and the lessons of the past should not be so easily forgotten.
Struan Stevenson was a member of the European Parliament representing Scotland (1999-2014), president of the Parliament's Delegation for Relations with Iraq (2009-14), and chairman of the Friends of a Free Iran Intergroup (2004-14). He is an author and international lecturer on the Middle East.

