On a summer afternoon in Georgia five years ago, Janet Randolph said yes to the cops. Her husband, Scott Fitz Randolph, said no. Last week he won in the Supreme Court, 5-3.
Justice David Souter's opinion in Georgia v. Randolph will never find a place among the Great Cases in Supreme Court history. Even so, the split decision provided a nicely dissonant change from the harmony that has marked the court since Chief Justice John Roberts came aboard when this term began.
The facts were never in dispute. The Randolphs quarreled. She ran off to Canada. Then she returned to their home in Americus, Ga. There the unhappy couple publicly quarreled again. The cops arrived. She told them her husband was inhaling cocaine. Over his emphatic objection, she directed police to their bedroom. There the incriminating evidence was in plain view.
Police arrested Randolph on charges of drug possession. Before the case could go to trial, he moved to suppress the evidence. The police, he said, had violated his Fourth Amendment right to be protected against "unreasonable" search and seizure. The Georgia courts agreed. Now the high court has affirmed.
This was the question: May one occupant of shared premises legally authorize police to search without a warrant, even when a co-tenant is present and objects? Until last week, lower courts overwhelmingly had answered "Yes." Now the answer provided by Justice Souter is "No." Scott Randolph is off the hook.
When he chooses to be crisp, Souter can be crisp. Last week he was uncrisp. He was deep in constitutional goo. The question in the Randolph case, he said, is "whether customary social understanding accords a consenting tenant authority powerful enough to prevail over a co-tenant's objection." Citing a 1990 case, he trudged on:
Justice John Paul Stevens, in his avuncular mode, provided a concurring affirmation. In today's world, he said, each of the Randolphs has a constitutional right that he or she may independently assert or waive. "Neither one is a master possessing the power to override the other's constitutional right to deny entry to their castle."
Justice Stephen Breyer evidently was of two minds. The Fourth Amendment, he said, does not insist upon "bright-line rules." Rather, it recognizes that no single set of legal rules can capture the ever-changing complexity of human life. In the case at hand, the officers easily could have obtained a warrant before accepting Mrs. Randolph's invitation. If the circumstances were different, he implied, he might have joined the chief justice in dissent. The next time, he might vote the other way.
"Mrs. Randolph did not invite the police to join her for dessert and coffee." She felt the need of the protective presence of the police. "The majority's rule apparently forbids police from entering to assist with a domestic dispute if the abuser whose behavior prompted the request for police assistance objects." As for Breyer's concurrence, it provides "a complete lack of practical guidance for police, let alone for lower courts."
Justice Souter's unpersuasive opinion, coupled with Breyer's fluttery concurrence, will not settle this recurring issue for long. Justice Samuel Alito had to sit this one out, but eventually he will be heard from, and Breyer will wobble back to the side of well-established law.