To withdraw from the treaty "effective immediately" is a violation of the treaty, which requires serving 90 days' advance warning. The North Koreans drool on such bourgeois bureaucratic objections, advising that when they set out to withdraw from that treaty in 1993, they in effect served the 90-day notice required by the treaty. That 1993 notice was merely sitting there in abeyance, like good wine waiting to be served when mature. There is a mind-boggling fog generated by these averrals. You guarantee A in 1993, suspend A in 1994, renew A in 2002, affirm non-A in 2003: The blur has a way of mystifying thought.
And the only thought one needs to keep in mind is that Kim Jr. is as unreliable as his father and that the feints and threats and digressions mean very little, but that we can parse a strategic design. It is that the North Koreans will use their repository, which may actually include one nuclear bomb or two, in order to press their concerns. These include: enfeebling the South Koreans, which could be done by alienating the United States to the point of withdrawing our two divisions there; getting oil; and appeasing China.
We read that an effort by the South Koreans, backed by the United States, is being made to penetrate North Korean ignorance by circulating radios that receive South Korean broadcasts. The radios currently in use in the north receive, like crystal sets, only predesignated transmissons, in this case, authorized government broadcasters. This means hour upon hour of official propaganda aimed at stressing the need for strenuous military activity as a defensive imperative and as testimony to national integrity. Radios that are sent into the country are emasculated: Solder is used to keep the dial out of reach of external temptresses.