The end of the state of Israel is simply not going to happen, and one has to proceed on the assumption that Arafat knows this. Some years ago Norman Podhoretz made the point that apparent advances in negotiations between Israel and Palestine were most usefully likened to negotiations between North Vietnam and South Vietnam from 1961 to 1972. No matter what was said, hinted at, endured, suffered, the North Vietnamese were headed for total control of the eastern Indochinese peninsula. By his reckoning, no declarations by the Palestinians, under the auspices of Camp David or Oslo or whatever, can be trusted.
What is not examined here is the role of democratic mechanisms on the Palestinian scene. It is common knowledge that perhaps one-third of the inhabitants of the West Bank yearn simply for a simple cessation of the hostilities, perhaps a third who think themselves armed with counter-warrant to Israel's, entitling them to reclaim the forfeited territories. And then a third who are clericals, professionals, educators, who seek negotiation but are not averse to taking advantage of any perceived weakness in the enemy or in the enemy's supporters.
What does Mr. Bush look for, then, as the likeliest conciliation of these forces? That they will cling to Arafat as their democratically elected leader? Do they look to him to judge the initiatives of the terrorists? When Israeli thunder strikes at Hamas leaders in the middle of the night, do such Palestinians view this as nothing more than a vicissitude of war?
Mr. Bush will no doubt continue with the general injunctions to democratic arrangements in Palestine without Arafat as leader. But these cannot plausibly reform the West Bank until there is a stout opposition press and political opposition. And there will never be a political opposition that cedes the existing territories in the West Bank, housing 200,000 Israelis, to the enemy. Bush can't wrest democracy from a stone, not even in sacred historical territories.