Cut and Walk From Afghanistan?

Not true. The inevitability of deep fraud was revealed publicly when Afghan President Hamid Karzai decided to ally with bad warlords to win. We were debating the consequences of a fraudulent election on national television long before the election. But part of the strategy to "enhance governance" was to build on the many provincial and local leaders who were able and trusted by their people while reducing the historic corruption in the Kabul government. Also, I and many others went to open-source briefings in the spring and early summer on deteriorating conditions in the battle against the Taliban. In policy circles, there have been no recent surprises.

--We can get the job done without too many boots on the ground in Afghanistan, with sophisticated surveillance, effective aerial targeting of al-Qaida and more focus on Pakistan (Vice President Joe Biden's plan).

This is the most dangerous rationalization, though it is seen broadly by experts as implausible. (Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was publicly dismissive of the plan. See also The Washington Post, Sept. 27, "Go All-In, Or Fold," by Rajiv Chandrasekaran.) The danger is that it could allow not only our government but also our public to take the easy path it offers while falsely thinking we are not merely making a slow-motion retreat leading to victory and enhanced operational capacity for al-Qaida.

The case against the efficacy of the Biden plan is laid out in uncontestable detail by Frederick and Kimberly Kagan (The Weekly Standard, "How Not to Defeat al Qaeda"), who refute the essential assumptions of the plan: "that al Qaeda is primarily a terrorist group and that it is separable from the insurgent groups among whom it lives and through whom it operates."

--"What's the exit strategy?" Sen. Kerry asks. "We should not commit troops to the battlefield without a clear understanding of what we expect them to accomplish, how long it will take, and how we maintain the consent of the American people. Otherwise, we risk bringing our troops home from a mission unachieved or poorly conceived."

Unfortunately, as our troops have been in Afghanistan for eight years already, it is rather too late -- even if we were to leave now -- to avoid Sen. Kerry's downside risk. But even if we had not entered yet, the whole concept of exit strategies presumes a knowledge of the future that wars almost invariably contradict. On Dec. 8, 1941, Gen. George C. Marshall and President Franklin D. Roosevelt had no idea how long World War II would last or what we were going to expect of our troops; FDR was looking for an entrance strategy. His only exit strategy was victory.

We may wish to have the war in Afghanistan largely resolved in our favor within a year, but the generals think it will take at least five years.

--"Mr. Obama promises not to send more troops to Afghanistan until he has absolute clarity on what the strategy will be," Kerry observes. "He is right to take the time he needs to define the mission."

Well, yes, in principle. But our troops are fighting and dying now. Winter is coming. The spring fighting season is only six months away, and it takes several months to mobilize, up-train and transport fresh troops. So think "yes, but quickly."

The president has three choices: 1) Cut and run, 2) cut and walk or 3) stay and fight with enough troops. Either No. 1 or No. 3 may be justifiable based on hardheaded thinking. No. 2 is an evasion of reality and sinfully would sacrifice American troops for no good purpose.