In that context he places Bin Laden in that long line of successful "reformists": "It may sound odd to classify a terrorist group as reformist, but a radical remake of the faith is indeed the underlying intention of Bin Laden." He notes that: "This 'reform' agenda has met with a certain amount of success ... Yet in places where their fighting message has run its course, recruitment has fallen off rapidly, both in response to the ugliness of their methods and, ultimately, to the radical utopianism of their aims. Countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria and Egypt have already passed, with varying degrees of pain, through the historical gauntlet of extremist militancy."

 Understanding both the potency, and the limitations, of the Bin Laden message permits us to begin to calibrate our responses rationally -- avoiding both the fatalism that an exaggerated estimate of his movement may induce and an insufficient effort that minimizing his influence may induce.

 Of course, the anticipated reform (or more neutrally expressed: change) of Islam is closely related to the political perception of the Bush Administration and its theoreticians in and out of government who see the Middle East as sick and dysfunctional. They see democracy, free markets and prosperity as the cure. I have supported that theory of success -- and continue to. If some form of self-government that respects fundamental rights can be instituted in Iraq, we would be a measurable distance down the path toward a safer world.

 To that end we should persevere in Iraq with as many resources and force as necessary. The Democracy project is difficult, but not without support amongst some Muslim reformists. The Dutch historian Rudolph Peters is quoted in the article contrasting the two competing impulses of reform as: "those who would subordinate Islam to progress and those who would subordinate progress to Islam."

 They both have authentic sources in the history of Islam. We have a powerful interest in encouraging the progress wing of Islamic reform -- and not just in Iraq. As American policy makers -- and the informed public -- gain a better understanding of the complexities of the current Islamic religious and intellectual ferment, we are less likely to merely project ham-handedly our Western definitions into that culture.

 With understanding and care, we can seek out and support those authentic parts of Islam that are compatible with peaceable relations. Importantly, we need to constantly re-check our assumptions about what is culturally possible against the changing realities of today's Islam. If democracy turns out to be not possible, other benign forms of governance should be considered. We are not nearly at that point yet, though.

 As our young soldiers fight and die in Iraq -- a heartbreakingly necessary part of this struggle against terrorism -- we must vindicate their sacrifice and match their courage with an applied wisdom as we engage the better lights of Islam.