With the bloody occupation of Iraq underway, Adelman's demeanor changed in his frequent appearances on CNN's "Crossfire" (where I often was a co-host). His mood became more subdued. The garish, oversized American flag necktie that Adelman wore as he urged war on Iraq was retired, as he somberly began to criticize (while never mentioning Rumsfeld by name).
On April 30 of this year, Adelman said a "miscalculation" had been made in war planning because the operation in Iraq "has gone worse than we expected a year ago." On June 28, he said "there were failures," adding that the purge of Baath Party members and "the dismissal of the army was something that we could have done a lot better." On Nov. 8, he said failure to clean insurgents out of Fallujah was "a bad decision."
Unlike Adelman, Kristol pinned defects in war-fighting tactics directly on Rumsfeld. In a Weekly Standard essay of Nov. 17, 2003 (written with his frequent collaborator, Robert Kagan), Kristol assailed Rumsfeld for sending insufficient troops to Iraq. "Rumsfeld remains dogmatically committed to a smaller force," he wrote.
Thus, the neocon message is that the war was no mistake but has been badly conducted. While Adelman does not blame his friend Rumsfeld, the accountability of the secretary of defense is implicit. Kristol's call for Rumsfeld's dismissal removes culpability for those who beat the drums to go to war.
Getting rid of Rumsfeld does not answer agonizing questions. Was the change of regime in Baghdad worth going to war? Could Saddam Hussein have been removed from power by other means? Is the use of U.S. military power to topple undemocratic regimes good policy?
There are no clear answers. To say simply that all would be well in Iraq, save for Don Rumsfeld, only begs these questions.