What's going on behind the ever-shifting scenes in the Mideast? The only
thing clear at this confused point is that it's awfully crowded back there.
At the United Nations, diplomats try to hammer out a cease-fire that would
end this war without leading to another. It's been nearly two years now
since U.N. Resolution 1559 was passed declaring that all militias in
Lebanon, including Hezbollah's, would be disbanded. The current resolution
in the works will also prove meaningless if it's not enforced.
Every time John Bolton appears before the cameras, some of us do feel more
hopeful. Our man at Turtle Bay actually got the French to agree to some
common objectives, like keeping Hezbollah away from Lebanon's border with
Israel - instead of rewarding it for starting this whole conflagration.
According to this draft resolution, Hezbollah would even be disarmed. But,
besides the Israelis, who's going to bell this tiger? Like its geography,
the diplomacy of the Mideast is full of mirages.
If the past is any guide, and it isn't always, the eventual cease-fire
(there will be one, won't there?) will reflect the lines on the ground. Once
the rockets' red glare and the bombs bursting in air have revealed whose
flag is still there, there may be a chance not for any real peace (that may
be too much to hope for) but a cessation of hostilities - rather than the
usual pause for re-supply and reinforcements.
A clearer view of what has happened these past few homicidal weeks will have
to wait till a Michael Oren (author of "Six Days of War") or an Abraham
Rabinovich (who wrote "The Yom Kippur War") writes a comprehensive review of
this latest unpleasantness, which doesn't even have a name yet. (I nominate
Hezbollah's War.)
Like the shifting lines of battle, history is subject to contention, too.
One can already see the historical narrative of each side forming, never the
twain to meet. But the world isn't waiting on the historians before reaching
some judgments on its own:
In Israel, the inevitable review of political and military strategy has
begun. Israel is full of armchair generals, not to mention the real ones in
that country's previous wars. They've started to chime in, too. An official
investigation, and its report, is sure to follow. Not to mention the
courts-martial. (How could the advanced Israeli warship that was struck and
disabled by a radar-guided missile not even have had its main sensor turned
on?)
Israel's coalition government, which seems to have taken ages to apprehend
the seriousness of the threat, will doubtless have to weather numerous
questions once this long cruel war is over, not to mention motions of
no-confidence.
A scapegoat is already emerging in Dan Halutz, the air force general who
directed an air war that was going to destroy Hezbollah's ability to pepper
the Jewish state with rockets and missiles. It didn't. Even if it did
inflict severe damage on Hezbollah - and on Lebanon.
The Israeli romance with the Rumsfeld Doctrine of shock-and-awe is fading
fast. An old, old lesson is being learned again: In the end, all that armor,
artillery, and naval and air support can only support the infantry, which
remains queen of battle. What will matter in the end is getting those muddy
boots on contested ground.
Meanwhile, in Lebanon, no one dares criticize Hezbollah, at least not too
loudly. For just where Hezbollah ends and the Lebanese "government" begins
has never been clear. If there is any light between Hezbollah's position and
Lebanon's, it tends to disappear when it's most needed - like now.
Hezbollah is Lebanon's government to a dangerous degree. It not only
occupies southern Lebanon but enough seats in the Lebanese parliament to be
represented in the Cabinet. Its informal network of charities and rocket
launchers has been spread all over Lebanon, like a vast spider's web.
Hezbollah isn't just a state within a state (its capital is Tehran) but one
with its own army and its own foreign policy. It is quite capable of
dragging Lebanon into war at any time - as it has just done. Which is why
the talk of the Lebanese army "replacing" Hezbollah in the south of the
country invites skepticism. What would be the difference for all practical
purposes? Only an international force, one capable of confronting Hezbollah,
could keep the peace. Maybe.
This war is still a work - or a catastrophe - in progress. The historians,
like the diplomats, may be able to confirm its results, but they cannot
determine them. Like the rest of us, Clio, muse of history, must wait for
dispatches from the front.