George Will

That, however, might mean ceding to the Taliban control of as much territory as it held when Osama bin Laden arrived in 1996 to begin plotting the operation that came to fruition five years later. Furthermore, because the Taliban is not a transnational terrorist organization, the reason America has identified defeating or taming the Taliban as a "vital national interest" pertains to territory: Otherwise al-Qaeda could again have space to train and plot under Taliban protection, or indifference.

Petraeus speaks less about decisively defeating the Taliban militarily than of the "reintegration" of lower-level Taliban into society and "reconciliation" of the higher level. This might seem like a piece of cake if you were, as he was, involved in the darkest days in Iraq. In December 2006, at the height of Iraq's sectarian violence, an average of 53 bodies -- often decapitated and lacerated by torture -- were found on Baghdad streets every 24 hours. Afghanistan's capital, Kabul, is, he says, tranquil, other than the occasional car bombs, which are not strategically significant.

Petraeus, who has a flair for understatement, says Afghanistan "is a bit of a kaleidoscope of different groups." That complicates counterinsurgency, concerning which he wrote the book -- the 472-page U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The three prongs of counterinsurgency -- "clear, hold and build" -- involve three entangled problems.

First, is an area "cleared" only because the Taliban have cleared out, knowing they can wait out the enemy and then return? The Americans are going home; the Taliban are home. Second, what can be held by a counterinsurgency force focused on an exit strategy? Third, can anything lasting be built when what has been only tenuously cleared is only conditionally held?

The answer to those questions must involve defusing an insurgency by means of a political settlement, after the insurgency has been weakened by the application of violence, and sapping its ardor with new institutions and economic infrastructure. Again, nation-building.

What Petraeus calls "a whole of government approach" does not promise a tidy ending of "take the hill, plant the flag, go home for a victory parade." Turning off an insurgency is "never a light switch, it's more of a rheostat." He recounts a story: An Afghan waits 99 years for vengeance, then regrets his impatience. This parable gives a serrated edge to a familiar Afghan aphorism regarding outsiders -- "You have the watches, we have the time." Tick, tick, tick.

George Will

George F. Will is a 1976 Pulitzer Prize winner whose columns are syndicated in more than 400 magazines and newspapers worldwide.
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