Sodomy ruling, part II: a liberal goldmine

 The Supreme Court's ruling in Lawrence v. Texas (the sodomy case) is a veritable gold mine for liberals and the shifting values they hold dear.
 
Not many conservatives I know have any desire to see the sodomy laws of any state enforced against homosexual behavior within the confines of one's private residence. But the Supreme Court's opinion had little to do with protecting that kind of privacy and much more to do with legitimizing homosexuality, moral relativism and the concept of the Constitution as an evolving document. And for good measure, the Court also took a gratuitous swipe at American sovereignty in the process.

 Sure, Justice Anthony Kennedy talked about privacy, and his reasoning could have disastrous consequences if applied to its logical conclusion, as Senator Rick Santorum correctly warned. But "privacy" is hardly what was motivating the majority. The Court was determined to make a statement endorsing homosexuality as a status, not just homosexual behavior. This is profound and far ranging, but part of a continuing progression of cases sanctioning homosexuals as a protected class. The Court in Romer v. Evans (1996), for example, struck down a Colorado statute that prohibited granting special protection to homosexuals under state antidiscrimination laws.

 In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy criticized (before overruling) the 1986 Supreme Court case of Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Court validated a state sodomy law, for demeaning the homosexual relationship. "To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse." And, "(The) continuance (of the Bowers case) as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons."

 I am not disputing that a criminal statute outlawing sodomy between homosexuals demeans the homosexual relationship -- of course it does, and it's intended to. Until relatively recently our society openly disapproved of such relationships. But it is equally true that the Court's language legitimizes such relationships -- and is intended to. Had the Court merely intended to protect the homosexual act within the home it wouldn't have addressed the "demeaning of the homosexual relationship." The Court also acknowledged the "dignity" of homosexuals "as free persons."