His major mistake was disbanding the army. And even this judgment should be rendered with a bit of humility. At the time, it seemed the right thing to do. In the Middle East, a major obstacle to democracy has always been the military: military power, military autonomy, military coups. Keeping Saddam's army risked the worst possible outcome: a future return to power of a Baathist army. For the long-run health of the new Iraq, it made eminent sense to abolish the army and start over.
The problem is you only get to the long run if you make it through the short run. And the challenge in the short run is putting down Sunni-Triangle resistance. Had we retained the old army, we might have had ready-made military units suitable at least for guarding stationary targets such as oil pipelines, thus relieving coalition troops to go after the enemy. Moreover, dissolution of the Baathist army released a large population of unemployed, disgruntled and weapons-trained young men. Some are undoubtedly shooting at our troops. We have now backtracked a bit, pursuing a less radical de-Baathification for the New Iraq Army.
These mistakes were serious, but have they cost us the peace? The media cover the sabotage of the oil pipelines. This is perfectly reasonable. It is news and it produces dramatic pictures. But the undramatic story is that Iraq is producing over 1.6 million barrels a day, more than three-quarters of 2002 production levels. Last week OPEC unexpectedly cut its production quotas -- boosting oil prices and rattling world markets. Why? Because it sees Iraqi oil production coming on line and seriously threatening world prices. Pictures show the sabotage story; OPEC has already acted on the production story.
Losing the peace? No matter what anyone says now, that question will only be answered at the endpoint. If in a year or two we are able to leave behind a stable, friendly government, we will have succeeded. If not, we will have failed. And all the geniuses will be vindicated.