This passivity is taken by administration critics to be a cynical attempt to manipulate U.S. public opinion in support of a dubious war. Nonsense. The administration already had remarkable across-the-board support for the war. Why raise expectations at home? It is an axiom of political life that you never raise expectations, whether in a political or military campaign, because your defeats are then magnified and your victories discounted.
It is true that the administration did not contradict the general view of an easy war. But not for domestic political reasons. It did so for obvious and very good military reasons. The target audience for these inflated expectations was not the American people but Saddam's henchmen.
Plan A for the war was a quick and devastating attack that would cause a collapse of the regime and lead to the ultimate military outcome--the Sun Tzu ideal of victory with barely a shot fired.
Plan A had several parts: an intense initial ``shock and awe'' air attack, a bold rush of armor to the gates of Baghdad and, fortuitously, a first-night decapitation strike on Saddam's own bunker. But the key to Plan A was a further psy-warfare element: planting in the Iraqi leadership the idea that an American victory was inevitable, that the war would be quick and that Saddam's collapse would be immediate--and therefore they should be prepared within hours to either flee or defect to the winning side.
The point of allowing expectations to remain unrealistically high was to encourage waverers in Saddam's entourage to turn against the regime very early and end the war even before it began. It was a good idea. It did not pan out. But given the possible benefits, it was certainly worth a try.
The regime did not collapse overnight. Hence Plan B, an adapted version to the original war plan. It involves real fighting and real losses. Plan A, in contrast, while always plausible, was a hope for the miraculous. It was a kind of antiwar plan, as it would not have required any real battles at all.
The miracle having not happened, we are now fighting a conventional war. And winning--thanks to the Franks plan and its flexibility, and despite the carping of those who in conflict after conflict see Vietnam in anything short of immediate immaculate victory.