Counter-Insurgency and

According to Kilcullen, the Iraqi government's central message is the Iraqi people "don't need militias to protect (them) against terrorists. The government can do that. Gain trust in the government to protect you, and move from a dependency on militias."

As for an operation designed to reinforce that message, Kilcullen said that in neighborhoods in Baghdad, "there has been a big effort to recruit and employ police in place and demonstrate presence on a 24-hour basis. This is so that they (the people in the neighborhood) feel the change (the improvement in security)."

Up until late 2006, Kilcullen suggested, the "single narrative" the United States pursued was "that as they (Iraqis) stand up, we stand down."

Unfortunately, "that message is not particularly comforting to Iraqis," he said. "The single big message (the Iraqi government and coalition are sending) now is that we are protecting the population and trying to achieve sustainable stability. We are improving security and doing it to create a sustainable space so Iraqis can do it themselves."

In the "message war," actions must align with words -- or the narrative is only so much hot air. The Iraqi government actually has a major advantage over al-Qaida and the "former regime elements" (FRE, Saddam's old supporters). All al-Qaida and the FRE offer is violence. They have no economic program, and their political program is "give power to us." Their power is a negative power.

Sectarian militias do offer local protection, but their protection often includes crime and thuggery. The Iraqi government offers prosperity, justice and peace -- the strategic payoff of democracy and integration in the global economic system. That is the strategic "single narrative," and it's appealing. But as Kilcullen said, that process begins with reliable police and local protection.