The African continent - vast, remote, and perhaps strategically unimportant in the minds of many unknowing Americans – is one of the most critical fronts in the global war on terror. And it is for a variety of reasons beyond humanitarian concerns.

Many of Africa’s countries are poorly governed and weakly defended. They are wracked with disease, famine, and brutal armed conflicts that frequently cross borders. Much of our vital natural resources come from what many still refer to as “The Dark Continent.” And terrorist networks like al Qaeda are keenly aware of – and capitalizing on – Africa’s vulnerabilities and the West’s increasing dependence on the continent’s resources.

Consequently, to ignore and ultimately lose Africa in the global war on terror would be nothing less than catastrophic, says Dr. J. Peter Pham, an expert on Africa who served as a diplomatic mediator in the West African conflict involving Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire back in 2001 and 2002. He has since returned to Africa on other official and research tours, and has frequently testified before Congress on the dangers, worldwide, posed by militant Islamism in Africa. His most recent testimony was in June on the growing Somali crisis, before a joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights & International Organizations, and the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation.

Pham directs the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University, where he also holds academic appointments in the Departments of Political Science and Justice Studies, as well as the Africana Studies Program. The author of several books and numerous scholarly essays, he is also an adjunct fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

Last week, Pham discussed with me the problems associated with Africa, international conflict, terrorism, and the dynamics between all.

W. THOMAS SMITH JR: Why should Americans - many of whom have a hard enough time understanding the importance of our military presence Iraq - be concerned about al Qaeda operations in Africa? Particularly when we have so many other strategic considerations, worldwide?

J. PETER PHAM: Terrorism requires three basic elements: a facilitating environment, opportunity, and a motivating force that sets it all in motion. All three are present in abundance in Africa:

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, drawing on the lesson of Afghanistan, made it clear: “Weak states…can pose a great danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”

Africa’s poorly secured, porous borders and vast ungoverned territories are a terrorist’s dream, as are its unstable governments and weak security services.

Add to weak states a target-rich environment.

Take West Africa, which currently supplies about 15 percent of America’s hydrocarbon needs—almost as much as the amount coming from Saudi Arabia—and which, according to the National Intelligence Council, is expected to supply up to 20 percent in the next five years, then a staggering 25 percent by 2015. Just this year, a small, ragtag group with purely local grievances succeeded in cutting oil production of America’s fifth-largest supplier, Nigeria, by an estimated 500,000 barrels per day, or approximately 25 percent. Imagine the repercussions if a major terrorist group got into the act.

As for motivating ideology, look no further than what militant Islamists, including al Qaeda, have said. Earlier this year, the official online magazine of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia published a study assessing significant advantages to shifting operations to Africa. And the extremists made a great stride towards this objective with the seizure of power in Somalia by a group of radical Islamists acting with considerable foreign assistance.

All this does not mean there are not other priorities. However, it does mean that indications are that Africa will be, if it is not already, the next front in the global war on terrorism. So, the short answer to “why Africa?” is that a small investment today will pay off handsomely in opportunities and lives not lost tomorrow.

SMITH: Can you elaborate on some of the U.S. counterterror efforts in Africa?

PHAM: No country has done more than the U.S. to combat and prevent terrorism in Africa. And since the attacks on the American homeland, four major multilateral programs have been established by the U.S. in Africa:

First, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based at Camp Le Monier in Djibouti helps develop a capacity in the Horn of Africa and partially along the eastern littoral of the continent. This is America’s only permanent military presence in Africa. Second, the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) complements CJTF-HOA activities by equipping, training, and assisting the governments of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in their counterterrorism efforts. Third, the modest Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) provides similar counterterrorism assistance in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Fourth, the new Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), launched last year, will include Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, and Senegal as well as the four countries of the PSI. If delivered as promised, the TSCTI will assist in improving political as well as military and security capacities.

That said, however, much needs to be done. Other than Nigeria’s inclusion in the TSCTI, there are no programs beyond “ordinary” military-to-military cooperation for whole regions: West Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa. Moreover, existing programs have largely focused on the admittedly daunting security challenges African states face on the ground. Provision needs to be made for building up the waterborne counterterrorism capacity of our partners.

SMITH: What about piracy? Are pirates on the high seas becoming a real issue for our Naval forces, and is it somehow connected to global terrorism?

PHAM: Piracy has not yet become a modus operandi for terrorists, but that does not mean that it will not become so. In fact, when you look at the where the three most pirate-infested waters of the globe are—the Straits of Malacca off Indonesia, the area off the coast of Somalia, and the western littoral of Africa—and consider the violent Islamist presence onshore in those areas, you arrive at the conclusion that it is only a matter of time. Hence we need to be preparing our Naval forces to act not only against potential state competitors, but also these smaller terrorist forces. Developing brown-water force capacity will become increasingly important, even as the importance of blue-water forces remains.

SMITH: Let’s move beyond Africa for a moment. What should our geo-strategic priorities be for the next several years?

PHAM: Our number one strategic priority should be to develop strategic priorities. While those serving in our military fighting on the front lines and in our intelligence agencies realize that with respect to terrorism, we are in for what many have termed “the long war;” our political culture seems to preclude the development of a hierarchy of priorities with long-term, intermediate, and short-term counterterrorism objectives. Congress in particular has shown little zest for making hard choices in allocating scarce resources based on what will necessarily always be incomplete information. On the other hand, the administration needs to take leadership and make the cases for choices that have to be made.

So I would say that the strategic priority for the next few years is somehow recognizing and communicating to the public that we need to prioritize in order to reduce the threat posed by terrorism and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack. We’re a democracy, so unless we get the public on board, the train is never going to leave the station.

SMITH: What are we doing right in the global war on terror?

PHAM: We are taking the war to the heartlands of the enemy. As long as we engage them there, that makes it less likely—however marginally—that we have to engage them at home. It’s very fashionable these days to talk about “offshore balancing” and “redeployment.” However, looking at it through the enemy’s eyes, that would look an awfully lot like withdrawal, which signals weakness, which invites further attacks. Just listen to what Osama bin Laden has said, he has explicitly stated that our withdrawal from Somalia and our failure under the Clinton administration to respond to the embassy bombings and the attack on the USS Cole emboldened al Qaeda.

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