Notably, his assertion that overall attacks in Iraq have been declining in recent weeks was actually corroborated by the contrarian report published on Sept. 5 by the Government Accountability Office. A graph in that report, titled "Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007)," shows overall attacks peaking in June then steeply dropping.

The very real success of Petraeus and his troops, however, represents only half the surge strategy -- the half our military can accomplish. The other half is political, and must be accomplished by Iraqi politicians.

Petraeus explained this in April. "The focus of Multinational Force Iraq is, of course, on working with our local Iraqi counterparts to help improve security for the people of Iraq in order to give Iraqi leaders the time and space they need to come to grips with the tough political issues that must be resolved," he said.

So far, this half of the surge has failed miserably. None of the major reforms believed necessary to reconcile Sunnis and Shiites have been enacted. De-Baathification has not passed. Oil laws have not passed. Amnesty has not been approved. Provincial elections have not been set. Constitutional amendments have not been adopted.

What did Iraq's politicians do while our troops courageously surged? They indulged in serial boycotts.

After Shiites and Kurds voted in June to remove Iraq's maniacal Sunni parliament speaker (who had accused U.S. forces of butchery and attributed sectarian violence in Iraq to the Israeli Mossad), the main Sunni faction declared it was boycotting the legislature until the maniacal speaker was restored. Shortly after that, Sadr's Shiite faction announced it was boycotting the parliament to protest the new bombing of the Golden Mosque. No sooner had the maniacal speaker been restored, and all factions had returned to parliament, than the parliament adjourned for a month-long vacation.

In August, the main Sunni faction announced it was boycotting the cabinet. Then, the faction headed by former interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi announced four of its five ministers would boycott, too. But they were merely catching up with Sadr's faction, five of whose members resigned from the cabinet in April.

This leads to a final thought: If Iraqi politicians don't learn how to work their own democracy soon, they may get a bitter lesson in how American democracy works next November. Unfortunately, if significant further progress is not made in Iraq, it will be difficult to avert a U.S. election that brings to power a government committed to a rapid withdrawal from that country regardless of the consequences for the people there -- or for our own national security.