-- Britain and France, in contrast, will likely insist on the enforcement of the warrant to maintain the institutional credibility of the ICC itself.

-- America can be expected to take a different approach. For a variety of reasons -- particularly the strong military objection to having soldiers tried by foreign courts -- the United States has not joined the ICC, and is not likely to do so during the Obama administration. The focus of American policy has been on negotiating a positive outcome in Darfur with Sudan's government instead of defending the institutional health of the ICC.

But progress in Darfur now requires the ICC warrant to mean something. Granting a deferral in exchange for another round of worthless Sudanese pledges and promises would be the surrender of international seriousness. Bashir's only hope of self-preservation should be the achievement of large changes on the ground in Sudan -- a verified cease-fire mechanism in Darfur supported by the international community; the implementation of resettlement and compensation; an end to all harassment of humanitarian groups; full compliance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan's north and south and with all other international commitments.

Until this type of cooperation is demonstrated, Bashir should be treated as an international pariah -- a designation he has fully earned. The Obama administration should quietly make clear to China, the African Union and others that a premature deferral is unacceptable, and that direct diplomatic contacts with Bashir himself will be limited to peace negotiations. Reprisals against aid groups and civilians in Darfur by Bashir's army and intelligence forces should result in serious consequences -- including the grounding of Sudan's air force, which both Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have favored in the past.

In the absence of Bashir's compliance, strong, consistent international isolation might slowly raise the regime's internal pressure. Sudan has a collective leadership -- more like a criminal gang than a totalitarian dictatorship. If the Sudanese army eventually decides that Bashir has become an international leper and liability, he might be replaced by someone who better understands the new rules of the game -- which do not include impunity for genocide. This is a distant prospect, but perhaps the best possible outcome.

Change in Darfur will not arrive with the delivery of an arrest warrant. It will require the construction of a broad coalition to isolate and marginalize Bashir. And if he is offered a negotiated way out, it must be costly and comprehensive.

These complex challenges now fall to the Obama administration -- ready or not.