Even Saddam believed he had a biological, chemical and, possibly, nuclear program in place. As David Kay told The New York Times following his post-invasion survey of suspected arms caches, Iraq was still researching and developing ricin production and weaponization up to the end. Otherwise, according to Kay, Saddam's scientists lied to the Iraqi leader about weapons programs in order to get government funds.

Among those who argued compellingly in favor of the war resolution was the now-contrite Edwards. On Sept. 12, 2002, he told the Senate that the time had come for decisive action against Saddam -- to do ``whatever is necessary to guard against the threat posed by an Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction, and under the thumb of Saddam Hussein.''

Edwards may feel that the war has gone badly -- who doesn't? -- but his vote was consistent with thinking at the time that prevention was necessary to survival. The invasion was clearly aimed at guarding against the unthinkable in the context of fresh and horrific wounds.

Saying that one's vote -- exercised in good conscience based on convincing information -- was a mistake is meaningless rhetoric in the service of politics. Clinton seemed to understand that and her resistance to the cheap grace of public confession was refreshing while it lasted.

Her biggest mistake, alas, was not in believing that Bush would place U.N. inspectors in Iraq, which was never part of the war resolution. Bush did say, perhaps disingenuously, that he hoped force wouldn't be necessary -- and many wished that inspectors, who were in Iraq, had had more time.

But Saddam was persistently in violation of U.N. resolutions. Believing Bush seemed a better bet than believing Saddam.

The clear intent of the resolution, meanwhile, was to authorize war, if necessary. That's what Clinton voted for. Her mistake is trying to pretend it was something else, and hoping no one will notice.