Back when nuclear weaponry and deterrence strategy still received serious national deliberation, most sensible people recognized a basic reality: Once the technology to build nuclear weapons became widely available, there was no way to stuff “the nuclear genie back in the bottle.”

In those days, only the most pollyannish and irresponsible – typically, arms control enthusiasts, Soviet dupes and one-worlders – nurtured illusions that nuclear proliferation could be wholly prevented. Toward that end, such “Genie-stuffers” generally promoted the negotiation of unverifiable treaties and unilateral U.S. restraint, if not actual disarmament.

Unfortunately, a domestic political squeeze-play (involving funding for the long-since-terminated Super Collider-Super Conductor then under construction in Texas) prompted the first President Bush to embrace such an exercise in American nuclear restraint: a U.S. moratorium on all underground nuclear testing.

Fifteen years have now elapsed since the United States last conducted an underground U.S. nuclear test. The unilateral moratorium ushered in a period in which little responsible thought, let alone rigorous debate, has been applied to America’s deterrent and what it will take to assure its future reliability and safety.

This is all the more astounding since, during this period, uncertainty has steadily grown about the actual condition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. As the Washington Post reported back in January 2002, “The Energy Department’s inspector general has determined that the growing problems associated with the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons, without nuclear testing, have become a ‘most serious challenge area’ for the [agency] that runs the weapons complex.”

It has, nonetheless, been nine years since questions about what it will take to ensure that this country has – and continues to retain – a credible nuclear arsenal were addressed in a way remotely commensurate with the importance of the issue. The occasion was a momentous debate in the U.S. Senate concerning ratification of one of the Genie-stuffers’ favorite hobby horses: a treaty permanently (albeit unverifiably) banning all underground nuclear tests.

This accord, known as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), is such a priority for the anti-nuclear crowd for a simple reason. Without periodic, realistic testing, it is not scientifically possible to assure with high confidence that existing nuclear weapons are as safe and reliable as we know how to make them. Even more risky would be the replacement of such aging weapons with new, modern and appropriate designs – absent the rigors of underground tests. Claims to the contrary are leaps of faith and defy historical experience.

When the Senate considered the CTBT in 1999, it took testimony establishing that, thanks to differing technological approaches and the considerable opportunities for cheating, the treaty would not have comparable effects on other nations. In addition, experts warned that other nuclear weapon states would continue modernizing their arsenals and proliferation among wanna-be nations would go on apace. These predictions have been validated by the passage of time. Continued...