One of the most important keys to America's economic
success has been its corporate bankruptcy code, which
effectively transfers ownership and control of assets from
people who can't make effective economic use of them to
people who can.
Whether the asset is a house, a car, a widget-making
machine, or an entire company, if the indebted owner of an
asset fails to put it to good economic use, i.e., make money,
bankruptcy will move those assets along.
The great reset button
It's that structured give and take enforced by the
bankruptcy code that keeps the capital market flowing
smoothly.
The right to repossess keeps lenders willing to loan
money, even to those with less than perfect repayment
histories. The ability to discharge their debts from failed
attempts enables entrepreneurs to dust themselves off and try
again.
And as long as both of these things keep happening,
entrepreneurs will keep trying -- and eventually someone,
somewhere, will succeed.
But that's if it's working properly
But what's happening today in the United States in the
name of economic rescue looks more and more like the exact
opposite of the structured give and take of the bankruptcy
code.
The multitrillion-dollar bailouts are bad enough, but it's
the absolute destruction of the ownership rights conferred by
bankruptcy that may well signal the utter death of America's
economy.
In at least one
highly publicized case, well-connected
JPMorgan Chase (NYSE: JPM) picked up an
entire bank without compensation to the former company's
bondholders. More recently, Uncle Sam used the bailout funds
it put into Chrysler as a justification for forcing the terms
of the automaker's bankruptcy over the objections of its
bondholders.
Building on that awful precedent,
General Motors bondholders were entitled to
only 10% of that company in its bankruptcy filing. The other
90% went to the U.S. and Canadian governments and the union
health
fund.
Now, these government-dictated terms may not seem like a
big deal -- but in fact they undermine the concept of private
property, the rule of law, and the protections of bankruptcy
that are the foundation of a functioning capital market.
Is it really that bad?
It is, and here's why: Nobody forces bond investors to
lend money to companies. They do so for the reasonable
expectation of a return.
The way they ensure that return -- and the reason they're
willing to lend at such low rates -- is through their right
to assume control of a company should it go bankrupt. That's
how Eddie Lampert picked up Kmart, eventually parlaying that
investment into what is now
Sears Holdings (Nasdaq: SHLD).
Take that right of control away, and you take away
bondholders' incentive to loan money at anything below
usurious rates.
That doesn't spell the end of debt financing, but it does
spell the end of cheap money -- and the end of companies that
relied on it to fuel their growth.
General Growth Properties , for instance, was
forced to declare bankruptcy earlier this year, despite
having both positive operating cash flows and balance sheet
equity, because it couldn't refinance its debt.
The big problem
Companies took on significant amounts of debt with the
expectation that they could roll over that debt when it
matured. And under normal circumstances, as long as they
maintained a decent balance sheet and solid cash flows, that
was true.
These days, though, chances are good that more companies
will wind up like General Growth Properties: bankrupt not
because their businesses were failing, but because they
couldn't pay off or refinance their debt when it came
due.
Chances are even better that the cost of borrowing will
increase because bondholders can no longer be assured of
getting their due in bankruptcy. From the bondholders'
perspective, after all, it's the
rightto collect on the assets, not the
actof collecting, that matters.
So who are we talking about?
Here are just a few companies that may face
substantially higher debt costs in the future -- with all
that implies for the underlying businesses.
Company
Operating Cash Flow
(in Millions)
Net Income
(in Millions)
Total Debt
(in Millions)
Shareholders' Equity
(in Millions)
Time Warner (NYSE: TWX)
$16,939
($13,785)
$39,683
$42,288
Boston Scientific (NYSE: BSX)
$1,372
($2,311)
$6,745
$13,174
Northrop Grumman (NYSE: NOC)
$3,068 Continued... |