Wednesday, April 11, 2007
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"Fighting Back Was Not an Option" Revisited
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Posted by:
Dean Barnett at
5:20 PM
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Colonel Austin Bay and I were planning a very civil blog feud on the nature of the British naval surrender that led to the appalling spectacle in Iran. Unfortunately, there’s not enough distance between us to have any real virtual hair-pulling. Still, what differences do exist between us are worth exploring.
We both think the soldiers acquitted themselves disgracefully after their abduction. Austin aptly calls the events in Tehran a “moral disgrace.” Our only dispute centers on the soldiers’ conduct during their actual abduction. I wrote (in so many words) that their subsequent declaration that “fighting back was not an option” was ludicrous. My suggestion was that they should have fought back, and that going meekly into Iranian custody paved the way for the ensuing national disgrace.
Austin, who knows a lot more about such thing than I do, disagreed, writing:
“Tactical surprise reinforced by heavy machineguns at close range (and lack of immediate backup) make surrender an understandable and probably appropriate decision. The situation strikes me as one of instant, futile slaughter. Better planning, better coordination with the supporting forces, and tighter tactical security may well have alerted and saved the sailors and marines. However, would, should, and could are the words of hindsight when staring down the bore of a heavy machinegun.”
I’m hardly in a position to take issue with Austin’s tactical assessment. The one bone I would pick here is whether the Iranians would have had the nerve to actually slaughter the British troops. I think there’s ample room for doubt on that score.
On Easter Sunday, Frank J. of IMAO.us posted a letter from one of America’s own guests of the Ayatollah from 1979 -1981. Frank’s correspondent is a Marine, and his whole letter is must reading. I found the following bit particularly relevant to mine and Austin’s conversation:
On the day of the takeover, the Marines were outnumbered at least 1000 to 1. We held the consulate and the communications vault for over 12 hours, helping to destroy equipment and classified material. We were under STRICT orders not to fire our weapons or pop gas grenades (too late for that last one..hee, hee, hee). We were eventually told that we were on or own and to make a break for it. The monkeys even put one of the diplomats in front of the comm vault peep eye with a pistol to their head and threatened to kill them unless the door was opened. It wasn't and they didn't. Once all the material was destroyed the doors were opened and they all got the crap beat out of them.
The reason I highlighted the part that I did is the enemy’s bluster often doesn’t conform with his actual intent. But there’s an even larger point here – if the British soldiers were going to avoid disgracing their nation, they had to begin “fighting back” at some point. Doing so would have jeopardized their lives. Whether they failed or succeeded, “fighting back” was the only way to honor their service and their country. Fighting back also would have struck a powerful blow for freedom, showing the true strength of free men and women.
But they didn’t fight back. As Medal of Honor winner Jack Jacobs observed on MSNBC, this troop’s sole apparent interest was self-preservation. I don’t think it’s unduly harsh to say that for this particular group of soldiers, “Fighting back is not an option” could serve as their platoon’s motto. If, as many of us suspect, this entire affair was an Iranian attempt to measure Western mettle, then “catastrophe” is too mild a word for what occurred.
Compliments? Complaints? Contact me at Soxblog@aol.com.
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Dean, I sincerely hope this is your last post on this issue. Everybody is agreed that the troops behavior in captivity was disgraceful. Any reasoned analysis of the "capture," however, leads to the conclusion Col. Bay reached. You've been beating a dead horse on that one for quite a while. |
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Those many of us who've never been in combat but served in the military might sometimes wonder how we'd do under fire. The fools amongst us might declare that he, or she, would have been "heroes" and that's the way you seemed to be going, although in an analytic sense.
Col. Jacobs has ever right to say what he did; he certainly earned his bones many times over. The rest of us need to follow DB's current analysis as he did in his conversation with Col. Bay. The question usually can best be stated as how we'd like to response and never as to how "heroic" we'd be. Thanks for seeing the difference, large as it is in fact.
Maybe those 15-Brits might now reflect about how it could have worked out differently "if only if," as should the captain of HMS Cornwall. I do wonder why we're not saying: "Former Captain!"
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I am not saying that their surrendering in the first place was right. I would like to think that if I were in their shoes I would have resisted (but I have not been in combat so I don't know). The decision the officer made in surrendering has a "Lord Jim" feel to it--doesn't it?
I think we all agree that their actions in custody and afterwards were deplorable (which causes us to question their judgment in getting captured). Should we just agree this was not the British Navy's finest moment and hope it never happens again. |
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The version of events that I've been hearing is that the sailors and marines were surprised during the transfer back to their RIB's, and were thus in no position to fight.
It is unclear to me how all 15 of them could have been in mid-transfer when the Iranians appeared. Ladders go up as well as down, and they only hold a few people, if they hold multiple people at all. Billy Pugh's (crane transfer equipment) generally are limited to 4 people per transfer trip, and likely would not be used for a transfer to a very small boat, anyway.
Completely aside from the question of whether they should have surrendered without a fight, I am confused as to how they could all have been surprised in "mid-transfer" as has been reported.
Does anyone here have better information on this?
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From statements made on 6th April 2007, by two most senior members of British patrol, Lieutenant Felix Carman, 26, and Royal Marine Captain Chris Air, 25. You can make your own judgment:
Felix Carman: "We were in Iraqi waters. On Friday 23 March I along with 14 of my colleagues were part of a routine boarding patrol. We approached an unidentified merchant vessel that our supporting helicopter had identified as worth investigation. We carried out a completely compliant boarding with the full cooperation of the Master and crew. The RM secured the vessel and the RN element of the boarding party then arrived and commenced a thorough search of the ship."
Capt Air continued: "It was during the boarding that we noticed the helicopter had returned to 'Mother', and we started calling the ship on VHF to find out why. A short while later two speed boats were spotted approaching rapidly about 400 metres away.
"I ordered everyone to make their weapons ready and ordered the boarding party to return to the boats. By the time all were back on board, two Iranian boats had come alongside. One officer spoke good English and I explained that we were conducting a routine operation, as allowed under a UN mandate. But when we tried to leave, they prevented us by blocking us in. By now it was becoming increasingly clear that they had arrived with a planned intent.
"Some of the Iranian sailors were becoming deliberately aggressive and unstable. They rammed our boat and trained their heavy machine guns, RPGs and weapons on us.
"Another six boats were closing in on us. We realised that our efforts to reason with these people were not making any headway. Nor were we able to calm some of the individuals down.
"It was at this point that we realised that had we resisted there would have been a major fight, one we could not have won with consequences that would have had major strategic impact. We made a conscious decision to not engage the Iranians and do as they asked. They boarded our boats, removed our weapons and steered the boats towards the Iranian shore."
Capt Air: "Let me be absolutely clear, from the outset it was very apparent that fighting back was simply not an option. Had we chosen to do so then many of us would not be standing here today. Of that I have no doubts.
"The Iranian Navy did not turn up lightly armed; they came with intent, heavy weapons, and very quickly surrounded us. We were equipped, armed and had rules of engagement for boarding operations within Iraqi water.
"We were not prepared to fight a heavily armed force who it is our impression came out deliberately into Iraqi waters to take us prisoner. Reasoning with the Iranians was our only option. We tried. We did our utmost to de-escalate the situation, but our words fell on deaf ears. They had come with a clear purpose and were never going to leave without us.
"The Iranians are not our enemies. We are not at war with them. Our rules of engagement at that time stated that we could only use lethal force if we felt that we were in imminent danger of a loss of life. By the time the true intent of the Iranians had become apparent - and we could have legitimately fought back - it was too late for action.
"We were completely surrounded, and in addition to the loss of life, any attempt to fight back would caused a major international incident and an escalation of tension within the region. Our team had seconds to make a decision and we believe that we made the right decision. We still believe this was the right thing to do."
Lt Carman went on: "Some have questioned why HMS Cornwall did not provide greater protection for the team. HMS Cornwall is there to guard the vital oil platforms and command the coalition forces. She is also the platform by where boarding teams can launch from and patrol out. Not only should she not have been closer to us but she physically could not have been, the water is simply too shallow. |
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"I would like to think that if I were in their shoes I would have resisted (but I have not been in combat so I don't know). "
I understand your meaning, but I don't think that a "what would you do if you were in combat?" is the real issue. That is a philosophical question. Look, if soldiers are ordered to engage, they will engage or be court martialed. The only thing for the sailors and marines to worry about is, one, what are my orders, and/or two, what have I been trained to do. If the decision not to engage was an order, I don't think we can necessarily speculate on the bravery or cowardice of the individual sailors and marines. Their lack of valor would only be evidenced if they were on their own and they surrendered.
In my opinion, it reflects poorly on the commanding officers. I think that their ordering their men not to resist was disgraceful and demoralizing. Any commanding officer that is unable to order his men to do what must be done, because of a small risk to his men should not have a command. Although they should seek to minimize the risk of their men, it is not their job to insure that no soldier ever gets hurt, ever. They have a job to do. Using some of your words, "I would like to think that if I were in their shoes (the commanding officer's) I would have resisted (or given orders to resist)(but I have not been in combat so I don't know). "
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"In my opinion, it reflects poorly on the commanding officers. I think that their ordering their men not to resist was disgraceful and demoralizing." by Alex
Yes, but one thing to note that is often missed in these discussions is that this was not a combat situation. These troops were not facing Iraqi insurgents or the Taleban in Afghanistan, so as Capt Air points out the Rules of Engagement are different. They could not fire until it became clear that their lives were in danger.
There aren't any, but let's assume the Iranian boats were not Iranian, but Al-Queda boats coming from Iraq. In that case, Capt Air would have ordered his troops to fire as soon as they came within range and rightly so. They would have been the enemy, folks the UK was at war with.
Instead Capt Air was dealing with representatives of another country claiming that his troops were in Iranian waters illegally. By the time it became clear that the purpose of the Iranians was to arrest them, they were surrounded and heavily outgunned. As Colonel Austin Bay writes: "Tactical surprise reinforced by heavy machineguns at close range (and lack of immediate backup) make surrender an understandable and probably appropriate decision. The situation strikes me as one of instant, futile slaughter." Except in the most unusual situations, no one is expected to die for their country if they're not at war. |
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We can all second guess what the Brit boarding party should have done during its capture vs. what it did, but we don't constitute the appropriate professional board of inquiry that presumably will be convened eventually in the UK to hear the facts and render judgment.
I think we can all, however, reasonably question the entire issue of the preparedness, security procedures, alertness, aggressiveness, and professionalism of the entire HMS Cornwall contingent, especially its Commander, for the organizational failure to anticipate, guard against, and properly resist an act of war by a potential belligerent. To say that Britain is not now in a state of war with Iran (as the Brit officer said) as an excuse for this debacle is disgusting, stupid, and beside the point. Both the UK and the USA fought a 35-year long Cold War against the Soviets and their puppets, without there ever being declared a formal state of war, and all manner of strategic maneuvering and tactical parrying and thrusting between our respective forces took place on a daily basis throughout the entire era. I was part of that war, as millions of other US and allied forces were. We never went in potential harm's way without knowing what our mission was, what the rules of engagement were, and without being prepared for all manner of "what if" scenarios, including potential boardings by hostiles (I was a nuke sub sailor - believe me, any number of nasty scenarios could have arisen from a boarding that would have had vastly greater potential to create an international "incident" than did the capture of 15 Brit sailors and marines in a couple of rubber boats).
The fault, therefore, is not just attributable to the 15 sailors and marines - it was indeed mostly a failure of command. Did the 15 acquit themselves more or less honorably even under the unfavorable circumstances their commanders left them in? Again, I dunno ... that is for the Brit authorities to determine.
I think I can say with considerable confidence, though, that any American boarding parties operating in the Persian Gulf today have got to be immeasurably better prepared to detect and resist any such incursions by hostiles. I don't believe an Iranian small craft would ever have been allowed within half a mile of an American boarding party without being confronted by a very nasty-looking attack helicopter armed to the teeth, shouting appropriate warnings in Farsi over the PA, to be followed shortly thereafter by a Hellfire missile up the arse of that unlucky vessel.
As to the rest of the boarding party's behavior following their capture, there is absolutely no excuse whatsoever ... they acted like frightened little schoolgirls, and not at all like the disciplined warriors they were supposed to be. If we can't pass collective judgment on that disgraceful and rather un-military behavior, then there are effectively no standards of military decency worth defending anywhere on earth.
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What we are talking about is the boarding party's commander. He was aware that his air cover had withdrawn, and even inquired as to why. He then observed Iranian boats headed his way. At that point, he should have maintained his defensive options until he could ascertain the situation. Instead, he loaded his boats. Once his crew were in the inflatables, they were literally sitting ducks. Had he instead remained on board the dhow and deployed his men in defensive position, it is unlikely they would have been taken. If nothing else, he would have been able to call in close naval or air support. Whether his conduct was appropriate will be up to others to decide, based upon all the facts. I am concerned, however, that his actions speak of a nation unaware of the risks at hand. The boarding party was taken because it was left completely exposed. The Royal Navy anticipated no real threat. From that one wonder whether the British in general perceive the storm that is gathering. It is something that has eluded them in the past, as well as the U.S. History does not repeat itself, according to Twain, as much as it rhymes. |
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"I think we can all, however, reasonably question the entire issue of the preparedness, security procedures, alertness, aggressiveness, and professionalism of the entire HMS Cornwall contingent, especially its Commander, for the organizational failure to anticipate, guard against, and properly resist an act of war by a potential belligerent." by athingortwo
While I've tried to explain the RM Capt's actions, I think this is the important point.
This was not the first time that Iran had captured British military personnel under this very pretext (in a similar incident in 2004, Iran detained eight British servicemen for three days, and released them after parading them in front of TV cameras). SO, what were they thinking, FFS (as the Brits would say)!?
I have trouble disagreeing with the officer in the situation, but they should not have been in that situation, or at least they should have been better trained for it in advance, so they perhaps would have reacted as Tom suggests. |
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How did the Iranians acheive tactical surprise on a flat ocean against the British? Were they all looking the other way or something? |
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Thank you for the additional information and comments.
Here is the question that is really glaring: If the helicopter aviator was there to provide air support and sees Iranian boats approaching--why would he leave? If this were a USMC operation I would never expect a USMC helicopter aviator to do that to fellow marines below. Am I missing something here? |
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Blogagog,
Apparently they were inspecting a ship and both their boats were tied up on the Iraqi side of it. They were probably on the Iraqi side of the superstructure as well. The Iranians probably had the Brit drill and timing down to the second. Their boats could have probably made the two mile sprint in 3-4 minutes, and by the time the chopper realized what was happening and warned the crew below there was too little time to do more than pile back into their boats to be sitting ducks.
So what should the ROE be now? My vote is to give 'em a half klick past the line. If they're not turning back by then, any warship within range should open up with whatever they have. |
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What I've found is that the ship being searched was a little further off shore, about 7.5 nautical miles off shore. A picture of one of the Iranian boats involved shows a low open boat (maybe 24') with large twin outboards and a machine gun mounted up front, so they could move fast. At 30 knots they could be there in 15 minutes, less if they were faster.
The covering helicopter had gone back to the HMS Cornwall some time before this incident began, apparently, and wasn't in the air to warn the crew. This seems to have surprised the marines and sailors searching the ship, given what Capt Air said above.
Specifically on this the British MOD said: "Our boarding started at 0739 local time and was completed at 0910 with the merchant vessel having been cleared to continue with her business. Communications were lost with the boarding team as the boarding was finishing … at 0910. HMS CORNWALL's Lynx helicopter, which had been covering the initial stages of the boarding, immediately returned to the scene to locate the boarding team. The helicopter reported that the two seaboats were being escorted by Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Navy vessels towards the Shatt 'Al Arab Waterway and were now inside Iranian territorial waters."
So, it sounds like the helicopter left before the Iranians were in sight. Given that this seems to have been well planned in advance by the Iranians and that it was a quick run out to the ship from shore, I would agree with RightWingNutter and guess they waited until the copter left and then took off at top speed after the Brits on the freighter.
On the ship being inspected, it may be possible that they Brits kept no proper lookout and only saw the boats after they heard them first. If true, this then would go back to a failure in training and preparation.
It should not have happened, but as has been noted by other posters, it's down to a failure of command, not so much to the poor guys facing the Iranian machine guns.
Clearly, since the Brits have been suckered by this trick twice now in three years, they had better change their ROE. RightWingNutter's suggestion sounds good to me. |
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That makes sense, RWN. But wow, what a glaring security hole! Let's hope they mended it. |
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How sad to see an institution that ruled the waves for 400 years if not longer succumb to lack of funding and lousy morale.
As far as I'm concerned this incident demonstrates amply why women don't belong in units where their safety is likely to be threatened. I can think of some women attorneys who could be as tough as anybody, but the woman in this unit should have been kept out of harm's way.
The British Army and Marines have the old warrior spirit and seem to be as tough as nails, but the Navy has turned into a sad, thin shadow of what it used to be. If public opinion polls are to be credited, this is no longer Winston Churchill's Great Britain. This lot would have surrendered to Hitler without a fight. They're not living up to the sacrifices that have kept them a free nation, and the world is never free from groups who will gladly exploit weakness. |
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Clearly the Brits did not see the inspection teams as combat teams, or there would not have been a female in the group. And I have to wonder how this condition might have influenced both the British officers' decisions and their standing op orders. Inclusion of this factor in after-action analysis seems to be conspicuous by its absence. |
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I guess the hint of what was to come in "her" comments was the use of the name of the notoriously liberal Hollywood actress ... and then of course what followed was that same-old same-old tired "chickenhawk" label that so many liberals use to try (unsuccessfully) to intimidate commentary and choke off any discussion whatsoever of military matters. Discussions that are led by those who, unlike the C-word labelers, realize and appreciate that all of our lives are at stake in this global war with the Jihadists, and therefore we damn well have a right to discuss how it's being fought, and to debate the standards of performance we adhere to in this war.
Contrary to jessica's post, actually, most of the commentary on this thread has been reasoned, informative, and mostly spot on. As this non-chickenhawk (I served, jessica ... did you?) can attest, the more people think and talk about the nuts and bolts of how we can best defend our civilization against those who would surely destroy it if they could, then the more likely we are to keep a stiff upper lip and resist the SurrenderCrats ... that is, those who would prefer that we focus instead on midnight basketball, saving the whales, raising taxes, ratcheting up the abortion count, and just about anything else in life that doesn't involve any "disgusting" reliance on military affairs. |
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in the line of fire; but as soon as the Brits knew their team was captured, they should have sent the big guns in...
Dividing one's forces inappropriately in the face of the enemy was what killed Custer's command, the Brits at Isandlwana, and so many others before and since... |
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"jessicalange writes: Wednesday, April, 11, 2007 11:50 PM
Still wondering....
When Barrett and the rest of TH columnists and commenters who criticize the British captives are planning on suiting up and showing us all how REAL soldiers fight."
I served voluntarily for six years when I was a younger man, Jessica. I have one son in the Marines and another who is fourteen and will likely enlist if his dreams of NFL and MLB fall through. My money is where my mouth is. I have a dog in this hunt. I have skin in the game. What, Jessica, do you have at stake, other than the risk of loosing an argument that you made anonymously on a blog where nobody much likes you anyway?
"Instead, we're stuck with armchair chickenhawk warriors who love to play hardball with OTHER people's lives."
Who, exactly, do you think is fighting this war Jess? Do you think that its being fought by liberals from major metropolitan areas? It is being fought by men and women, and their sons and daughters, who have a serious commitment to the security of the US. They are predominantly red state, fly-over-country volunteers. They have a terrible love and pride for their country, and they are willing to kill or die to defend it. They also believe that people like you are the unavoidable price that must be paid for freedom of speech. They will die (and have died) to protect your right to speak your mind, but they don't think like you do. In fact, they believe that free speech is a right, not a requirement, and that the right to shut the hell up is an under-utilized one.
Britons are a proud people and they have much to be proud of. Most of them will draw the correct conclusions from this shameful affair. I am confident that, when the chips are down, they will find the spine that their ancestors won such fame for.
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Great work. You've given me a better perspective. |
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