Sunday, July 29, 2007
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Do Not Cede One Inch
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Posted by:
Patrick Ruffini at
5:25 PM
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Hugh and Dean think that online advantage is tied to macro atmospherics more than it is to specific online tactics. They'll be surprised to know that by and large, I agree. I wrote a piece on just this matter two weeks ago titled, "Message vs. Tactics Online." My position: message matters more -- and we probably won't be in a position to remedy our position online until Hillary Clinton is the opponent.
Needless to say, I think this a disagreement about more than tactics. It is about a basic responsiveness and willingness to answer questions. If our candidates believe themselves too haughty to answer an oddball question or two, that makes it less likely they'll listen to us on immigration, spending, and the war. Why? Because at some level, they think they're above certain forms of criticism. They think they always know best.
I also think it's a question of whether they'll be savvy enough to channel the flood of grassroots support that will arrive on their doorstep on February 6 of next year. Will they welcome them in with open arms, or set up elaborate rules and restrictions governing their interaction with the campaign and the candidate? Young volunteers like Josh Hersh and Ann Marie Curling are literally begging their candidates to get more engaged online -- because that makes it easier for them to recruit more volunteers and build an on-the-ground infrastructure to elect them.
On the message front, I don't believe the Republican campaigns are as volunteer-centric as they could be right now, and that isn't helping Republican enthusiasm any. When campaigns define themselves in the press in terms of insider terms like electability, money raised, and cash-on-hand, they shouldn't be surprised when volunteers stay away. When Republican candidates prioritize high-dollar fundraisers with 50 or 100 people over a debate watched by 2 to 3 million people, not even thinking of the online fundraising bump the debate could generate, that sends a message that the grassroots don't matter to them.
For all its riches, the Bush campaign was never like this. The volunteer goals were just as important as the money goals. And we had some pretty fired-up volunteers, largely because of the political environment, but also because of the body language of the campaign was welcoming and open.
The immigration example Hugh uses is a case-in-point of failing to capitalize on enthusiasm for the long term. That was a huge victory for talk radio and the Rightroots. But what do we have to show for it? Where is the million person email list of volunteers recruited during the immigration battle that we can activate again and again on the war, earmarks, and electing conservative candidates in '08? It's not true that the conservative base isn't energized on anything. They were energized on immigration, but because of a basic lack of online savviness or willingness to put the Web first, that energy has dissipated. That's in marked contrast to the MoveOn model, wherein they continue to bank activists on fight after fight, using them to mobilize them for the next battle.
Dean is right that you can't have tactical success without enthusiasm. But getting the tactics right is essential to channeling the enthusiasm. To some extent, Kerry blew it by not having a rational spending plan for all his extra riches. Howard Dean flooded Iowa with orange hats. So Democrats don't have this stuff down pat yet, something Obama has been especially cognizant of. But I do think they are closer to mustering the necessary combination of enthusiasm and tactics than we are.
My basic message here is that we can't take anything for granted, and we cannot cede one inch of ground to the Democrats. Just because the enthusiasm isn't there right now, that doesn't excuse us from doing our homework, or sending a dead-wrong message to the young grassroots activists who power our campaigns.
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