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Guest post from Josh Trevino:

Hugh rightly notes two things about the Ethiopian airstrikes in Somalia of the past day: that they represent a meaningful escalation in the fighting there, and that they are a big deal. (A good map of the attendant ground combat is here.) But they do not, pace the referenced AP piece, represent the beginning of the latest Somali-Ethiopian war. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi avers that his nation has been "forced to enter a war," and though this is true to some extent -- the mere existence of a neighboring Islamist state is casus bellum in a sane world, and the Somali Islamists declared jihad months ago -- it is not, as he wishes to convey, a recent development. I wrote six months ago about the initial Ethiopian invasion of Somalia: when the Islamic Courts Union threatened to consolidate its control of the entirety of Somalia outside the breakaway regions of Somaliland and Puntland, Ethiopian forces rushed to occupy Baidoa on ostensible behalf of the UN-recognized Somali transitional government. Forgive me if I repeat myself in explaining exactly why the Ethiopians care enough to do so:

Ethiopia has reason to fear the ascent of the [Islamic Courts Union, the Taliban-style movement taking over Somalia proper]. In addition to the ordinary concerns that a neighboring Islamist state might bring, Ethiopia itself has a significant Somali population within its borders. The proportion of Somalis in Ethiopia is not especially large -- about 6% -- but they inhabit and dominate the strategically important Ogaden region. [Control of the Ogaden is a historic objective of Somali nationalists, and has led to ruinous war in recent memory.] Furthermore, despite its historic Christian identity, modern Ethiopia actually has a Muslim plurality of nearly half. The combination of Somali nationalism plus Islamization is one that the Ethiopian state can hardly afford. Were an ICU-style movement to gain traction within Ethiopia, a Muslim Ethiopia reflecting demography — and demographic trends — is more than conceivable. Add to this the (probably spurious) Ethiopian conviction that the ICU is aided by longtime enemy Eritrea, and the case for intervention becomes overwhelming.

So much for the Ethiopian rationale for war, which has only been strengthened since by the ICU's expressed interest in the creation of a "Greater Somalia." The veneer of legality is provided by the defense of the transitional government, but it is only that. That this government -- which governs nearly nothing -- is seated in Baidoa, exactly halfway down the highway from the Ethiopian border to Mogadishu, is no accident.

The American rationale for this war is remarkably similar to the Ethiopian: we have a compelling interest in the eradication of an Islamist state of any type, anywhere in the world. That the Somali ICU has requested and received foreign jihadi assistance only bolsters the case for its eradication: we should know better by now than to permit an unmolested mixing of Islamists from around the world. The rise of the Somali Islamists also illustrates rather well the intersection of Muslim states' complicity in the expansion of jihadism around the world: according to the CSM, "a UN Monitoring Group report has charged that Eritrea, Egypt, Djibouti, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan have all contributed funds, arms, and technical support to help Somalia's Islamists take control." This is a combination that neither Ethiopia nor America can ignore.

The Ethiopian Army in happier days, when it only fought AIDS.

Absent the ability to take meaningful action in the Horn of Africa ourselves -- and even if the political will was present, the American soldiers are not -- the choices of proxies are small. We do have a small Marine presence in Djibouti, and we are doing our best to import Ugandans (and one assumes others, under the guise of a just-approved UN "peacekeeping" force) into the theater; but Ethiopia is the only meaningfully large ally in the region. It is reasonable to believe that we are supporting their war effort. (Concurrent to our own "war on terror," and cognizant of Ethiopia's role as a mostly-Christian power in a Muslim region, we have had an active relationship with their military in the past decade; as part of that, I visited an Ethiopian Army hospital in fall 2003.) The Western media refers to this a "tacit" complicity, but the reality is probably more active. The Ethiopian war machine is certainly battle-tested, but a strategic air campaign of the sort we've seen in the past 48 hours is not its forte. One might well ask where its targeting data is coming from; and one might note that it has no neighbors able, and far less willing, to provide it. One might also note that American forces are positioned astride Ethiopia's only remaining outlet to the sea, in Djibouti, now that its traditional port of Asmara, the Eritrean capitol, has been in hostile hands for over a decade.

The mention of Eritrea brings us to the problematic aspects of supporting Ethiopia, and in particular the government of Meles Zenawi, in this war -- and not just because Ethiopian paranoia over putative Eritrean designs in Somalia is a partial motivation for this war. In attacking the ICU, Ethiopia is doing the right thing, and Ethiopia is a natural ally of the United States in the Horn of Africa; but for all this, we cannot forget that the present Ethiopian regime is a thoroughly bad one on several fronts. Zenawi is a good ruler of Ethiopia only when set against his predecessor Haile Mengistu Mariam, the former Communist despot there who was recently convicted of genocide. (Mariam presently languishes in Zimbabwe, under the protection of another genocidal tyrant.) Meles Zenawi's government is, however, not above a small-scale genocide of its own -- in this case, against the Anuak people of the western hinterlands -- and executing anti-government protestors. Add in its propensity for belligerence that can only be described as stupid -- its horrifyingly bloody 1998-2000 war with Eritrea was fought over a near-worthless strip of disputed border -- and we must be aware that the Zenawi regime is an imperfect ally at best. Indeed, given the probability that he will, Putin-like, use the present war to cement his grip over his nation, an ideal American policy ought to support the Ethiopian war and the Ethiopian people who deserve far better than their succession of bloody-minded autocrats.

But that is ideal American policy. Even if it strengthens the cruel grip of the likes of Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia deserves our support. The expressed fear now is that it will lead to a broader regional war: the worst-case scenario has Kenya joining Ethiopia against Somalia, as Eritrea and the Sudan intervene on the side of the Islamists, with Djibouti suffering from a severe case of divided loyalties, and various expeditionary forces from within and outside of Africa entering the fray. (On the latter count, in addition to the aforementioned foreign jihadists, Yemen has a historic interest in the the military balance in the Horn.) But from the American perspective, even this putative worst-case scenario is preferable to the actual worst-case scenario: an Islamist state, beyond the realm of law and justice, secure on the east African coast. We know what happens when those polities arise and endure: it has not been so very long since the fruits of the last one slaughtered thousands in our own streets.